NOTE ON THE MILITARY CRITICS. 



433 



country mutually acted, and reacted upon each other. Neither a 

 student nor a traveller, he knew nothing of human character except 

 as he saw it exhibited at home, and there he certainly sometimes 

 found excuses for severity and even despotism. It is undeniable 

 that he was endowed with a peculiar genius, but it was that kind 

 of energetic genius which may raise a dexterous man from disgrace, 

 defeat or reverses, rather than sustain him in power when he has 

 reached it. He never was popular or relied for success on the demo- 

 cratic sentiment of his country. He ascertained, at an early day, 

 that the people would not favor his aspirations, and, abandoning fed- 

 eralism, he threw himself in the embrace of the centralists. The army 

 and the church-establishment, — combined for mutual protection 

 under his auspices, — were the only two elements of his political 

 strength; and as long as he wielded their mingled power, he w T as en- 

 abled to do more than any other Mexican in thoroughly demoralizing 

 his country. As a military demagogue he was often valuable even to 

 honest patriots who were willing to call him to power for a moment 

 to save the country either from anarchy or from the grasp of more 

 dangerous aspirants. Until the army was destroyed, Santa Anna 

 could not fall, nor would the military politicians yield to the civil. 

 As long as this dangerous chief and his myrmidons remained in 

 Mexico, either in or out of power, every citizen felt that he was 

 suffering under the rod of a Despot or that the progress of his 

 country would soon be paralyzed by the wand of an unprincipled 

 Agitator. But with the army reduced to the mere requirements of 

 a police system, and Santa Anna beyond the limits of the Republic, 

 the nation may breathe with freedom and vigor. 1 



1 See vol. 2, chapter xii, p, 155. Reflections upon the Republic. 



Note. These historical sketches of the late war with Mexico are designed to pre- 

 sent a rapid view of the chief events and motives of the international conflict rather 

 than to portray the separate actions of civil and military men who were engaged in 

 it. We have, therefore, not been as minute as might be desired either by ourself or 

 by interested individuals. This, however, will be remedied in the general " His- 

 tory of the War between Mexico and the United States," which we design 

 publishing. 



In narrating the battles we have sketched them according to the published plans of 

 the commanders on both sides. This is the fair system of describing and judging ; but 

 whether those plans were always the most judicious, is a matter for military criticism 

 in which we have not present space to indulge. Resaca de la Palma, Monterey, 

 Buena Vista, Vera Cruz, Molino del Rey, Chapultepec, and the time as well as the 

 mode of capturing the capital, have all been discussed and condemned by the prolific 

 class of fault finders — most of whose judgments, when at all correct, are founded 

 upon knowledge acquired or assured subsequently to the actions, and which was en- 

 tirely inaccessible to the commanders when they fought the battles that are criticised. 

 One thing, however, should gratify our Generals exceedingly, and it is that in truth 

 they did fight and win the several actions in question, notwithstanding their blunders 

 and notwithstanding the fact that their junior civil and military critics could have 

 fought them so much better! They had, it seems, a double triumph — one over 

 their own stupid ignorance and another over the pnemy ! 



