Literary Property and International Copyright. 



existed a natural sense of property — an intuitive conviction of a 

 natural right to acquire, possess and enjoy external things. 



But how is this primal idea, this abstract right to be actualized? 

 How does an individual acquire exclusive title to and dominion over 

 a particular thing ? It is mainly to this question that attention has 

 been directed by writers on natural law. Chancellor Kent wrote: 

 " The exclusive right of using and transferring property follows as a 

 natural consequence from the perception, and admission of the right 

 itself." Grotius and Pufendorf base the right on social compact; 

 holding that there must have been a previous implied assent that the 

 first occupant should become the owner. But Locke, Blackstone, 

 Barbeyrac and others insist that such implied assent or tacit agree- 

 ment is not essential ; that the right is created by the act of occu- 

 pancy, or that it is the fruit of labor. This may be regarded as the 



The full recognition of this exclusive right, both as it respects the 

 use and the substance of things, was the result of growth and develop- 

 ment. Referring to the germinant period of legal ideas, we find that 

 he who first began to use a thing acquired a property therein, by 

 common consent ; but this property was understood to continue so 

 long as the exclusive use or occupancy continued, and no longer. 



This rule was well adapted both to the capacity and the wants of 

 man in a rude and undeveloped condition of the race. His nature 

 was largely sensuous; he lived mainly in the outward, the material ; 

 he could not grasp abstract ideas. Hence the truth of the saying that 

 "property without possession was too abstract an idea for savage life." 

 And hence, also, the fact that mere occupancy or use of external things 

 was ample for the few and simple wants of man in the childhood of 

 the race. 



But when the population of the earth and the wants of man in- 

 creased ; when social relations became more complex, and the interests 

 of individuals began to clash, the necessity of a more complete title to 

 and dominion over subjects of property became apparent. It was seen 



use only, P but to the very sttbstance of the thing used. This advance 

 idea was a corollary from the primary, natural sense of property, as 

 well as a social necessity ; but the perception and recognition of the 

 idea was principally due to the necessity. 



Next, in the natural and logical order of development, came the 

 right of transferring both the use and substance of a thing from one 

 person to another. Ownership of the substance carried with it the 

 right of transfer. 



