The First Constitution of New York. 



from long imitation of England. For many years after New York 

 became an independent State, the governor, in imitation of the king 

 and his colonial predecessor, addressed the legislature at its opening 

 in person, and the legislature, like the English parliament and the 

 colonial assembly, immediately responded in a message expressive of 

 its high consideration and its views upon the executive recommenda- 

 tions. The convention of 1821 prescribed the written message of to-day, 

 on the ground that the English plan brought the legislature and the 

 executive so closely together as to be unrepublican. 



Every innovation of the Constitution of 1777 hinged upon the one 

 radical and necessary innovation of a governor deriving his authority 

 directly from the people, instead of from the king, and responsible 

 directly to them for its exercise. Long suffering because of the arbi- 

 trary exercise of authority by royal governors had made all the 

 colonies supremely jealous of the one man power. In New York they 

 had convened and prorogued the colonial assembly at will; had con- 

 stantly and grossly abused their absolute veto upon all acts passed by 

 that body; and in the long series of collisions which preceded the 

 ^Revolution had thus done much to hasten the crisis. Jay showed his 

 conscientious adherence to precedent by preserving both these func- 

 tions to the governor, at the same time creating rigid safeguards 

 intended to prevent their abuse. Most of the colonies deprived the 

 elective governor of all power in assembling and dismissing the legis- 

 lature, and instead of the veto gave him simply a casting vote in law- 

 making. But the New York governor was empowered to convene 

 the legislature "on extraordinary occasions," and to prorogue for 

 sixty days — an authority never but once exercised. 



But New York had seen a royal assembly filled with sycophants, 

 elected as recently as 1768; and, therefore, distrusting popular assem- 

 blies quite as much as the one man power, they devised a series of 

 novel expedients for making one a check upon the other. They not 

 only inaugurated John Adams' plan of two legislative bodies, but de- 

 vised a council, a sort of third and final legislative chamber, suggested 

 no doubt by the English privy council. To this body — the apex of 

 the pyramid — they intrusted the power of veto. This "council 

 of revision" was the chief evidence of the reluctance with which these 

 statesmen surrendered inherited institutions. Its defect lay in the 

 fact that it smothered individual responsibility, by making the gov- 

 ernor but one of four men upon whom responsibility fell equally. His 

 associates in the veto were the chancellor and two judges of the 

 Supreme Court. Keliance upon the judges was natural and safe, but 



