150 



FOREST AND STREAM. 



[March 18, 1890. 



Costly Connecticut Trout.— Irvin W. Talbot, of 

 East Granbv, was brought before .Justice Sidney E. 

 Clarke, of this city, at Bloonifield yesterday, for a viola- 

 tion of the trout "law. T^lhot pleaded guilty, and his 

 fines and costs averaged $17.42 per trout — a luxury which 

 but few can indulge in at these prices. President A. C. 

 Collins of the Connecticut Association for the Protection 

 of Game and Fish of this city appeared for the State. 

 The association bave had an eye on Talbot for some time, 

 and at last they found him fishing in Griffin's Brook, in 

 North Bloornfield, last month. Talbot is an old offender 

 —just the kind of parties that the long-named society 

 likes to tackle. The trout law is not off until April 1. — 

 Hartford {Conn.) Telegram-Record, March 8. 



The South Side Sportsmen's Club of Long Islandheld 

 its annual meeting last Tuesday evening in Parlor 4 at 

 the Hotel Brunswick and pleoted the following officers 

 for the ensuing year: President, Roland Redmond; Vice- 

 President, H. Duncan Wood; Treasurer, Geo. P. Slade; 

 Secretary, Francis O. de Lnze; Counsel, Geo. G. DeWitt, 

 Jr. ; Executive Committee for two years, H. L Nicholls. 

 F. O. de Luze, G. H. Redmond, John G. Hecksoher. 



Indianapolis, Ind., March 4. — There has been fishing 

 in White Run cff and on since Christmas, and numbers 

 of our black bass which beat the world have been caught. 

 A T^lb. channel catfish was taken from a troll line two or 

 three weeks ago. As we have had no ice the season bids 

 fair to open rich and at least a month earlier than usual. 

 We are probably behind all other States in pisciculture, 

 but are picking up.— Enos B. Reed. 



The Salmon of Alaska will be the subject of a lecture 

 before the Scientific Societies of Washington, March 20, 

 by Dr. Tarleton H. Bean. 



NETS ARE A NUISANCE. 



IN advance of its publication elsewhere we give to-day 

 the full text of the recent decision rendered by the 

 Court of Appeals of this State, declaring the constitu- 

 tional integrity of the statute which declares nets unlaw- 

 fully set to be" nuisances, and as such subject to summary 

 destruction: 



George W. Lawton and another, appellants, vs. WauAJtN. 

 Steele, respondent. New York Court, of Appeals, Feb. 2V 1890. 



E. O. TCowson for appellants; Elon B. Brown for respondent. 

 Andbews, J. 



The conclusions of the trial judge that Black River Bavisa 

 part of Lake Ontario, within the meaning of Chap. 146, of the Laws 

 of 188R, and 'hat the nets set therein were set in violation of the 

 act. Chap. f>91. of the Laws of 1880. as amended hy Chap. 317 of 

 the Laws of 1883, were affirmed hy Die General Term. The trial 

 judge, in his careful opinion, demonstrated the correctness of 

 these conclusions, and nothing can he added to reinforce the ar- 

 gument by which they were sustained. 



The point of difference between the trial court and the General 

 Term relates to the eonsti'utionality of the pection of the act ol 

 1880, as amended in 1893. That section is as follows: "Bee. 2. Any 

 net found, or other means or device for taking or capturing fish, 

 or whereby they may be taken or captured, set, put, floated, had, 

 found, or maintained in or upon any of the waters of this State, 

 or upon the shores or islands in anv waters in this State, in viola- 

 tion of any existing or hereafter to lie enacted statutes or laws 

 for the protection of fish, is hereby declared to be, and is a public 

 nuisance, and may be abated or summarily destroyed by any per- 

 son, and it shall he the duty of each and every (game and fish) pro- 

 tector aforesaid and of every game constable to seize, and remove 

 and forthwith destroy the same * * * and no action for dam- 

 ages shall maintained against any person for or on account of 

 anv sueh seizure and destruction." 



The defendant, justified the seizure and destruction of the nets 



the plaintiffs for the value of the nets. The General Term sus- 

 tained the constitutionality of the statute and reversed the judg- 

 ment. We concur with the General Term for reasons which will 

 now be stated. 



The legislative power of the State which by the constitution is 

 vested in the Senate, and Assembly (Sec. 1, Art. 3). covers every 

 subject which in 1 he distribution of the powers of government 

 between the legislative, executive and judicial departments, bo- 

 loners by practice or usasre, in England or in this country, to the 

 legislative department, except in so far as such powers have been 

 wit hheld or limited by the constitution itself, and subject also to 

 such restrictions upon its exercise as may be found iu the con- 

 stitution of the United States. From this grai t of legislative 

 power springs the right of the Legislature to enact a criminal code, 

 to define what acts shall constitute a criminal offense, what pen- 

 alty shall be inflicted upon offenders, and generally to enact all 

 laws which the Legislature shall deem expedient for the protec- 

 tion of public and private rights, and the prevention and punish- 

 ment of public wrongs. The Legislature may not declare that to 

 be a crime which in its nature is and must be under all circum- 

 stances innocent, nor can it in defining crimes, or in declaring 

 their punishment, transgress any fundamental right secured by 

 the constitution. Rut it may, acting within these limits, make 

 acts criminal which before were innocent, and ordain punish- 

 ment in future cases where before n one could have been inflicted. 

 This in its nature is a legislative power which by the constitution 

 of the State is committed to the discretion of the legislative body. 

 (Barker vs. People, 3 Cow. 686; People vs. West, 106 N. Y. 293.) 



The act in question declares that nets set. in prohibited 

 waters are public nuisances, and authorizes their summary 

 destruction. The statute declares and defines a new species of 



Eublic nuisance, not known to the common law, nor declared to 

 e such by any prior statute. Rut we know oC no limitation of 

 legislative power which precludes the Legislature from enlarging 

 the category of public nuisances, or from declaring places or 

 property itsed to the detriment of public interests or to the injury 

 of the health, morals or welfare of the community, public nuis- 

 ances, although not such at common law. There are, of course, 

 limitations upon tho exercise of this power. The Legislature can- 

 not use it as a cover for the withdrawing property from the pro- 

 tection of the law, or arbitrarily, where no public right or interest 

 is involved, declaie property a nuisauce for the purpose of devot- 

 ing it. to destruction. If the court can judicially see that the 

 statute is a mere evasion, or was framed for the purpose of indi- 

 vidual oppression, it. will set it a«id« as unconstitutional, but not 

 otherwise. (In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98; Harlan, J., Mugler v. Kan- 

 sas. 123 U. S. 661 ) There are numerous examples in recent legis- 

 lation of the exercise of the legislative power to declare property 

 held or used iu violation of a particular statute, a public nuisance, 

 although such possession and use before the statute was lawful. 

 The prohibitory legislation relative to the manufacture or sale of 

 intoxicating liquors in various States, has in many cases been 

 accompanied by provisions declaring the place where liquor is un- 

 lawfully kept, for sale, as well as the liquor itself, a common or 

 public nuisance, and while the validity of prohibitory statutes in 

 their operation upon liquors lawfully acquired or held before 

 their passage, and in respect of the procedure authorized thereby, 

 have been the subject of much contention in the courts, the risrht 

 of the Legislature by a new statute to impose upon property held 

 or used in the violation of law, the character of a public nuisance, 

 is generally admitted. (See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378; 

 Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Grayl; Mugler v. Kansas, supra.) The law- 

 making power is not exhausted by single exercise, nor limited to 

 subjects covered by the common law. 



The legislative power to regulate fishing in public waters has 

 been exercised from the earliest period of the common law. The 

 statute 2 H. 6, 0. 15, prohibited the use of nets in the Thames if 

 they obstruct navigation or the passage of fish. Lord half, in 

 his treatise De Jure Maris, page 33, says that "the Ashing which 

 the subject has in this or any other public or private river, or 

 creek, fresh or salt, is subject to the laws for the conservation of 

 fish and fry* which are maiiy." In this State many statutes have 

 been enacted, commenoing at an early period, regulating the 



right of fishing in the waters of the State, prohibiting the use of 

 nets or the fakir g of fish at certain seasons, and for the protec- 

 tion of certain kinds of fish. (I. Rev. St. Ed's Ed.. 687, et seq.; 4 id. 

 pg. 96 et seq.) It has become a settled principle of public law that 

 power resides in the several States to regulate and control the 

 right of fishing in the public waters within t heir respective juris- 

 dictions. (Smith v. Maryland, 18 now. TJ. S. 71; Hooker v. Oum- 

 mings, 20 John. 101; Smith v. Levin us. 8 N. Y. 472; 3 Kent. Com. 415). 



We think it was competent for the Legislature, in exercising the 

 power of regulation of this common and public right, to prohibit 

 the taking of fish with nets in specified waters, and by its declar- 

 ation to make the setting of nets for that purpose a public nui- 

 sance. The general definition of a nuisance given by Blackstone, 

 1 Vol 3. pg. 215, is "anything that worketh hurt, inconvenience or 

 damage." It is generally true, as stated by a recent writer (Wood 

 on nuisances, See. 11), that nuisances arise from the violation of 

 the common law, and not from the violation of the public statutes. 

 But this, we conceive, is true only where the stature creates a 

 rieht or imposes an obligation and affixes a penalty for its viola- 

 tion, or gives a specific remedy which by the terms of the statute 

 or by construction is exclusive. (See Rulbrook v. Goodere, 3 Burr. 

 1770). But the principle stated has no application where the 

 statute itself prescribes that a particular act or property used for 

 a noxious purpose shall be deemed a nuisance. 



The Legislature in the net in question, acting upon the theory 

 and upon the fact (for so it must be assumed) that fishing with 

 nets in prohibited waters is a public injun,bave applied the 

 doctrine of the common law to a case new in instance but not in 

 principle, and made the doing of the prohibited act a nuisance. 

 Tin's we think it could lawfully do. The more difficult question 

 arises upon the provision in the second act of 1883, which author- 

 izes any person, and makes it tfte duty of the game protec r or to 

 abate the nuisance caused by nets set in violation of law, by their 

 sumruary destruction. It insisted that the destruction of nets by 

 an individual, or by an executive author so authorized, without 

 any judicial proceeding, is a deprivation of the owner of the nets 

 of this property, without due process of law, in contravention of 

 the constitution. The right of summary abatement of nuisances 

 without judicial process or proceeding, was an established prin- 

 ciple of the common la w long before the adoption of our constitu- 

 tion, and it has never been supposed that this common law prin- 

 ciple was abrogated by the provision for the protection of life, 

 liberty and property in our State constitution, although the 

 exercise of the right might result in the destruction of property. 

 This question was referred to by South erland, J., in Hart v. the 

 Mayor, etc. (9 Wend., 590). ne said: "If this is a case in which 

 the corporation or any other person had a right to summarily re- 

 move or abate this obstruction, then the objection that the appel- 

 lants by this course of proceeding may be deprived of their 

 property without due process of law, or trial by jury, has no 

 application. Formal legal proceedings and trial bv jury are not 

 appropriate to, and have never been used in such cases." (See 

 also opinion of Edmunds, Senator in same case. p. 609.) 



In the License T; x case (5 How. U.S. 504), Judge McLean speaking 

 of this subject saio: "The acknowledged police power of a State 

 often extends to the destruction of property. A nuisance may be 

 abated. Everything prejudicial to the Health and morals of a city 

 may be removed." In R' ckwell v. Nearina (35 N. Y. 808) Porter 

 J., speaking of the constitutional provision said: "There were 

 many examples of summary proceedings which were recognized 

 ae due process of law at the date of the constitution and to ihem 

 the prohibition has no application." Quarantine and health laws 

 have been enacted from time to time from the organization of 

 our state government, authorizing the summary destruction of 

 infected cargo, clothing or other article*, by c fficers designated, 

 and no doubt has been suggested as to their constitutionality. In 

 Hart v. The Mayor etc.. (supra), a question was raised as to the 

 validity of a city ordinance, subjecting a float moored in the 

 Albany Basin to summary seizure, and sale upon failure of the 

 owner to remove same after notice. The court held the ordin- 

 ance to lie void as not within the power conferred upon the city 

 by its charter, but it was held that the common law right of 

 abatement existed, although the removal of the float in question 

 involved its destruction. Van Wormer v. The Mayor (15 Wend. 

 283), sustained the right of the corporation to dig down a lot in 

 the city, to abate a nuisance, although in the process of abate- 

 ment buildings theron were pulled down. In Meeker v. Van 

 Rensselaer (15 Wend. 397), the court, justified the act of the de- 

 fendant, as an individual citizen, in tearing down a filthy tene- 

 ment house which was a nuisance to prevent the spread of 

 Asiatic cholera. 



These authorities sufficiently establish the prooosition that the 

 constitutional guaranty does not take awav the common law 

 right of abatement of nuisances hy summary proceeding wichout 

 judicial trial or process. But in the process of abating a nuisance 

 there are limitations, both in respect of the agencies which mav 

 bo employed, and as to what maybe done iu execution of the 

 remedy. The general proposition has been asserted In text boolts 

 and repeated in judicial opinions, that anv person may abate a 

 public nuisance. But the best considered authorities in this 

 country and England new hold that a public nuisance can only 

 he abated bv an individual where it obstiucte his private right or 

 interferes at the time with his enjoyment of a right c< mnion to 

 many, as the right of passage upon the public highway, and he 

 thereby sustains a specal injury. (Bro« n v. Perkins, 12 Grav 89; 

 Mavor of Colchester v, Brooks, 7 G. B. £30; Dimes v. Petley, 15 id. 

 276; Fort Plain Bridge Co. v, Smith, 30 N. Y. 44; narrower v. Rit- 

 son. 37 Barb. 301.) 



The public remedy is ordinarily by indictment for the punish- 

 ment of tho offender, wherein on judgment of conviction the 

 removal or destruction of the thing constituting the nuisance, if 

 physical and tangible, may be adjudged, or by bill in equity filed 

 in behalf of the people. But the remedy by judicial prosecution 

 in rem or in personam, is not. we conceive, conclusive, where tho 

 statute iu a particular case gives a remedy by summary abate- 

 ment, and the remedy is appropriate to the object to be accom- 

 plished. There are nuisances arising from conduct which can 

 only be abated by the arrest and punishment of the offender, and 

 in such cases it is ohvious that the Legislature could not direct In- 

 direct the sheriff or other officer to seize and flog or imprison the 

 culprit. Tho infliction of punishment tor crime is the prerogative 

 of the court and cannot be usurped by the Legislature. The Leg- 

 islature can only define the offense and prescribe the measure of 

 the punishment where guilt shall have been judicially ascertained. 

 But as the Legislature may declare nuisances, it. may also, where 

 the nuisance is physical and tangible, direct its summary abate- 

 ment by executive officers, without the intervention of judicial 

 proceedings, in cases analogous to those where the remedy by 

 summary abatement existed at common law. Marvin, J., in his 

 able opinion in Griffith v. McCullom (46 Barb. 561), speaking of 

 the remedy for the abatement of nuisances, says: "That which is 

 exclusively a common law for public nuisance cannot be abated 

 by the private acts ofjndividtials. The remedy is by indictment or 

 criminal prosecution, unless the statute has provided some other 

 remedy." 



Tne cases of Hart v. The Mayor, etc. (supra). Van Wormer v. 

 Albany (supra) and Meeker v. Van Rensselaer (supra) show that 

 the public: remedy is not in all cases confined to judicial prosecu- 

 tion . But the remedy by summary abatement cannot be extended 

 beyond the purpose implied in the words, and must he confined 

 .to what is necessary to accomplish it. And here lies, we think, 

 the stress of the question now presented. It cannot be denied 

 that in many cases a nuisance can only be abated by the destruc- 

 tion of the property in which it consists. The cases of infected 

 cargo or clothing and of impure and unwholesome food arc plainly 

 of this description. They are nuisances per se. and their abate- 

 ment is their destruction. So also there can be little doubt, as 

 we conceive, that obscene books or pictures, or implements only- 

 capable of an illegal use, may he destroyed as a part of the pro- 

 cess of abating the nuisance they create, if so directed by the 

 statute. The keeping of a bawdy house, or a house for the resort 

 of lewd and dissolute people, is a nuisance at common law. But 

 the tearing down of the building so kept would not be justified as 

 the exercise of the power of summary abatement, and it would add 

 nothing, we think, to the justification, that a statute wasproduced 

 authorizing the destruction of the building summarily as a part 

 of the remedy. The nuisance consists in the case supposed in the 

 conduct of the owner or occupants of the house, in using or allow- 

 ing it to be used for the immoral purpose, and the remedy would 

 be to stop the use. This would be the only mode of abatement in 

 such case known to the common law, and the*destruction of the 

 building for this purpose would have no sanction in common law 

 or precedent (see Babcock v. City of Buffalo, 56 N. Y. 26S; Barclay 

 v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa. St. 503; Ely v. Supervisors, etc., 36 N. Y. 

 297). 



But where a public nuisance consists in the location or use of 

 tangible, personal property, so as to inlerfere with or obstruct a 

 public right or regulation, as in tho case of the float in the Albany 

 Basm (9 Wend. 571), or the nets in the present case, the Legisla- 

 ture may, we think, authorize it3 summary abatement by execu- 

 tive agencies without resort to judicial proceedings, and any 

 in jury oi destruction of the property necessarily meidout to the 

 exercise of' the summary jurisdiction interferes with no legal 

 right of the owner. But the Legislature could not go further. It 

 could not decree the destruction or forfeiture of property used so 

 as to^constitute a nuisance as a punishment of the wrong, nor 

 ' even, we think, to prevent a future illegal use of the property, it 



not being a nuisance per se, and appoint officers to execute its 

 mandate. The plain reason is that due process of law requires a 

 hearing and trial before punishment or before forfeiture of prop- 

 erty can be adjudged for the owner's mieennduct. Such legisla- 

 tion would be a plain usurpation by the Legislature of judicial 

 powers and under guise of exercising the power of summary 

 abatement of nuisances, the Legisl iture cannot, take into its own 

 hands the enforcement of the criminal or quasi-criminal law. 

 (See opinion of Shaw, Oh. J. in Fisher v. McGirr, supra, and in 

 Perkin v. Brown, 12 Gray 89 ) 



The inquiry in the present case comes to this, whether the de- 

 struction of the net« set in violation of law, authorized and re- 

 quired by the act of 1883, is simply a proper, reasonable and neces- 

 sary regulation for the abatement of the nuisance, or transcends 

 that purpose, and is to be regarded as the imposition and infliction 

 of a forfeiture of the owner's right of property in the nets, in the 

 nature of a punishment. We regard the case as verv near the 

 border line, but we think the legislation may be fairlV sustained 

 on the ground that the destruction of nets so placed is a reason- 

 able incident of the power of the abatement of a nuisance. The 

 owner of the nets is deprived of his property, but, not as the direct 

 object of the law, but as incident to the abatement of the nuisance. 

 Where a private person is authorized to abate a public nuisance, 

 as in case of a house built in a highway, or a gate across it, which 

 obstructs and prevents his passage thereon, it was long ago held 

 that he was not requirt-d to observe particular care in abating 

 the nuisance, and that although the gate might have been opened 

 without cutting it down, yet the cutting down would be lawful. 

 (Lodie v. Arnold, 2 Salk. 458, and cases cited). But the general 

 rule undoubtedly is that the abatement must be limited by neces- 

 sity, and no wanton and unnecessary iujury must, be committed, 

 (3 Bl. pg. 6, note). It is conceivable that nets illegally set. could 

 with the use of care be removed without destroying theui. But 

 in view of their position, the difficulty attt ndmg their removal, 

 the liability to injury in the process, their comparatively small 

 value, we think the Legislature c mid adjudge their destruction as 

 a reasonable means of abating the nuisauce. 



Tbese views lead to »u affirmance of the order of th° General 

 Term. The case of Well, r v. Snover (42 N. J. Law R. 341), tends 

 to sustain the conclusion wo have reacued The action in that 

 case was trespass, for entering the plaintiff's lands, bordering a 

 non-navigable si ream in New Jersey, and destroying a fish ba«ket 

 in the waters diverted therefrom, placed for the catching of ri h, 

 contrary to the statute. The court held the statute to be a, justi- 

 fication. The cose of Williams v. Blackwell (2 Hurlst. & Colt. 33), 

 arose under an act of Parliament which authoriZ' d the summary 

 desi ruction by fish wardens, ot what is known as salmon engines, 

 being fish rets set in violation of the act. The case is not an 

 authority upon the power of one Legislature under the limitations 

 of the State constitution, but the legislation upon which the 

 action was founded shows that in a country governed by the 

 principles of Magna, Charta, such legislation i^ not deemed in- 

 consistent with the fuudamenuit doctrines of civil liberty. It is 

 insisted that the provision in the act of 1883, authorizes the de- 

 struction of nets found on the. land, on shores or islands adjacent 

 to waters, where taking of fish by nets is prohibited, and that this 

 part of the statute is in any view unconstitutional. Upon this 

 premise it is insisted tbat the whole seciion must fall, as the 

 statute, if unconstitutional as to one provision, isuncon Q t,itutional 

 as a whole. This is not, we think, the general rule of law where 

 provisions of a statute are separable, one of which is onlv void. 

 On the contrary the general rule requires the court, to sustain the 

 valid provisions, while rejecting the others Where the void 

 matter is so blended with tne good that they cannot be sep irated, 

 or where ihe court cannot judicially see that the Legislature 

 only intended the statute to he enforced in its entirety, and that 

 by rejecting part the general purpose of the stat te would be de- 

 feated, the court, if compelled to defeat, the main purpose of the 

 statute, will not strive to save any part. (See Fisher v. MeGirr, 

 supra.) 



The order granting a new trial should he affirmed and judgment 

 absolute ordered for the defendant on I hp stipulation, with costs. 

 All concur, except O'Brien, J„ not sitting. 

 (A copy. H. E. Sickels, Reporter, per C.) 



ANGLING CATALOGUES. 



AS the. angling season approaches, so does literature of interest 

 to the fly or bait-fisherman appear in the shape of pro- 

 fusely illustrated catalogues of ihe dealers in anglers' supplies. 



t>ne of the largest of those lately rereivf d is tbat issueu by Tho«. 

 J. Conroy, New York city, win is still doing business at the old 

 Fulfm street stand. His catalogue is very compl«te. and a full 

 index at the beginning of the book enables one to refer instantly 

 to any desin d line ot ironds. 



A new feature in this catalogue, and one that will save both 

 buyer and seller much troublesome calculation, is a taole show- 

 ing the capacity of various reels to hold lines of all sizes. By ref. 

 erence to this the purchaser can at once see what size reel is 

 needed to carry any line. This catalogue will be sc-nt on recipt of 

 25 cents. 



Thos. H. Chubb, the Fishing fled Manufacturer, sends us hia 

 1890 catalogue of his excellent fishing taofcle and anglers' supplies,. 

 Tne pages are filled with illustrated descriptions and price lists, 

 whicn will be studied with interest at. this opportune season. 

 They show a growing business at Post M lis. As a supplement to 

 the business part of the. book Mr. Chnhh hns collectea a nnmher 

 of capital angling papers, written specially for the catalogue. 

 Tooy run all the way from the work of Mr. W. H. H. Murray to 

 "Brother Gardner." 



The Norton Mancfactuiung Co., of Bristol, Conn., tell us 

 that the steel rod is in great demand this year. A nevv style, of 

 wtiich a few bave heeu made to or^er, i" a ni •kle-nlated rod. 



Messrs. Chas. Plath & Pon. No. 130 Canal street. N. Y., send 

 us their price list of fishing tackle, much of which is intended for 

 salt- wa»er fishing, though the goods in it comprise all grades and 

 tackle for all varieties of sport. 



The Best Fishing Tackle in the Would is to be found at tho 

 salesroom of Thos. J. Conroy, 65 Fulton street, N, Y. See adver- 

 tisement opposite first page of reading matter.— Adv. 



SAWDUST IN ONTARIO STREAMS. 



Editor Forest and Stream: 



I have noticed iu a late number of your journal a letter 

 from "Anti-Sawdust" upon tho sawdust question, and I 

 must say that .my experience with mill-refuse in Ontario 

 leads me to believe that its presence in the rivers and 

 streams is detrimental to the fish and other interests of that 

 country. 



Year's agOj before any considerable amount of sawdust 

 was thrown into the Otouabec River at Peterboro. magnifi- 

 cent black bass (large aud small-month) fishing was to be 

 had at many points upon that fine stream, particularly at 

 Campbelltown aud the east outlet, for it had three, into 

 Rice Lake. At the last mentioned point Genio C. Scott had 

 some ot the finest bass fishing of his life, aud in later years 

 Gen. G. B. McClellan and Geo. Sheridan aud many other 

 persons have enjoyed themselves for hours fighting that 

 purple-hued tiger of the fresh waters, the small-mouthed 

 black bass. The throwing of mill-rubbish into the Otonabee 

 at Peterboro began years ago, but it required some time 

 before it eould get its work in upon the lower portion of the 

 river. The Little Lake at Peterboro, which is about two 

 miles long, and upon which the people of tbat town did all 

 their boating, was filled up with the refuse from the saw-mills 

 to such an extent that in 1880 and 1881 the steamers of (Jal- 

 cutt's line had to plow through acres of the stuff to get to 

 the dock. While a steamer was being forced through the 

 sawdust for many yards around it boiled and seethed, giv- 

 ing off vast quantities of gas, and that this gas was dis- 

 tasteful to the fish was abundantly attested by their almost 

 entire absence from the vicinity. Gradually all the holes 

 in the river were filled, and every spring, when the water 

 was high and the current fast, the river became a boiling- 

 mass of water-soaked sawdust. In the course of time it 

 reached the mouth, twenty-one miles from Peterboro, chok- 

 ing the three outlets so badly that the steamers coufcduse 

 but one. As the rubbish extended itself down the river the, 

 fish, maskiuonge, small-mouth black bass, and even the 

 large-mouthed gave way before it to such an estpnt a,s to 

 cause the fishermen to almost entirely forsake the Otouabe*. 

 On the other hand the bass nshing > of the upper Trent hao 



