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Indiana University Studies 



tion whether the central board should be abandoned and the 

 old boards of trustees resurrected. No State that has had 

 a central administrative board has ever abandoned it. But 

 there may be in the future a very serious question v^hether a 

 supervisory board should not be created in addition to the 

 administrative board and the dual system be established. 



There is one question v^hich has arisen recently in con- 

 nection v^ith the administrative board of either the adminis- 

 trative or dual type, v^hich is v^orthy of further note. Is it 

 necessary that members of administrative boards should them- 

 selves receive a large salary and devote all their time to the 

 work? This question, tho of relatively little importance in 

 the past, may become of importance in the future, owing to 

 the attitude of many charitable workers. The Rhode Island 

 State Board of Charities and Corrections was the first admin- 

 istrative board to be created in the United States (1869). 

 Tho in name and composition it followed the supervisory 

 type, yet it was given administrative functions, and was in 

 reality a board of control. Following the supervisory type in 

 many ways, however, it was a large board of nine, and no 

 compensation was paid the members. Until 1915 this was 

 the only administrative board in the United States whose 

 members did not receive compensation. The New Hampshire 

 act of 1915 which abolished the board of control and substi- 

 tuted a board of trustees is, in consequence, a distinctly new 

 departure. Since the New Hampshire act was the result of 

 popular indignation owing to the removal by the board of 

 control of a competent superintendent of the State hospital, 

 for political reasons, it remains to be seen whether the experi- 

 ment will prove of value. Charity workers are still claiming 

 that the mere fact that members of boards of control are 

 paid large salaries inevitably means the introduction of the 

 spoils system into State institutions. However, the cen- 

 tral administrative board, tho unpaid, has large powers 

 of appointment and removal, and of controlling contracts and 

 the purchase of supplies. It would seem that these powers 

 would present a sufficient inducement for the entrance of 

 partisan politics, whether the members of the central board 

 received salaries or served without compensation. The roots 

 of the spoils system lie far deeper than the salary of a State 

 board. To eradicate partisan politics there is needed rigid 



