22 DAVID ANDERSON-BERRY, M.D., LL,D., ETC., ON 



ideas will tend to work itself out and to realize itself in action 

 immediately, without suffering the opposition of antagonistic 

 ideas which, in the normal state of the brain, might altogether 

 prevent its realization in action." 



Is that so ? Well, if it is so I judge I may suppose that by 

 ymntal dissociation is meant what I said, interference where spirit 

 and matter, mind and brain-cell, meet. 



Again, being in the quotation vein, I quote from Bain in his 

 book Mind and Body : " Extension is but the first of a long series 

 of properties all present in matter, all absent in mind. Inertia 

 cannot belong to a pleasure, a pain, an idea, as experienced in the 

 consciousness. Inertia is accompanied \ath. Gravity, a peculiarly 

 material quality. So colour is a truly material property ; it 

 cannot attach to a feeling, properly so called, a pleasure or a 

 pain. These three properties are the basis of matter ; to them 

 are superadded Form, Motion, Position, and a host of other 

 properties expressed in terms of these. Attractions and Repulsions, 

 Hardness and Elasticity, Cohesion and Crystallization. Mental 

 states and bodily states cannot be compared." 



And Professor Tyndall : " Molecular groupings and molecular 

 motions explain nothing ; the passage from the physics of the 

 brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable : 

 and if love were known to be associated with a right-handed 

 spiral motion of the molecules of the brain, and hate with a left- 

 handed, we should remain as ignorant as before as to the cause of 

 the motion." 



Here we are left then with your pain. We have traced it from 

 its source in the finger to its destination in the Rolandic area of 

 the brain, and we are left there with its being still a motion 

 amidst molecules. But what you feel is not a motion but actual 

 pain. It may be merely a pin-prick, still, as Tyndall says, the 

 passage from motion in the molecules to pain in the mind is 

 unthinkable. On the one hand there is something that moves : 

 on the other there is something that feels. These are, they must 

 be, difJerent substances. True, Bain combines the two by saying 

 that the phenomena of matter and the attributes of mind are 

 but the two sides of one substance. That is to say, two irre- 

 concilably antagonistic sets of phenomena and attributes belong 

 to one substance. 



There is, then, no truth in what we saw to be a principle, neces- 

 sary and universal, to wit, phenomena imply substance/ and, 

 consequently, different phenomena imply different substances. 



