THE CONSCIENCE. 



145 



this presently when we turn, as I propose we should now turn, 

 from these general considerations as to the nature of Conscience 

 to the question of that Liberty of Conscience wliich has so often 

 served as a trampet whence no doubt " soul-animating strains " 

 have sometimes been blown, but which (it must be confessed) 

 has also sometimes given but an uncertain sound. 



What do we mean by Liberty of Conscience ? It cannot of 

 course mean liberty to have Conscience, that is consciousness, of 

 the moral quality of actions. For this cannot be directly 

 exposed to. external interference. Does it then mean liberty to 

 act according to what one knows to be right ? It does mean 

 this ; but it has also generally been taken to include beside this 

 liberty to act according to what one thinks to be right, and it is 

 in respect of this part of its meaning that the chief difficulties 

 connected with the subject arise. 



One can only hioio, in the proper sense of the word, that to 

 be right which is really right ; but one may think that to be 

 right which is not so, as well as that which is. Yet opinion 

 may be mistaken for knowledge both by the person who opines 

 or thinks, and by others to whom he communicates his opinion ; 

 while, although we may doubt whether knowledge can be 

 mistaken for opinion by him who knows, it is certain that we 

 may mistake others' knowledge for opinion. This is so, not only 

 in respect of morality, but of other things also. Freedom to 

 express all sorts of opinion is admittedly a security for the pro- 

 gress of knowledge ; not that all opinions are equally valuable 

 or likely to lead to knowledge, but that restraint of the freedom 

 to express any opinion is a su.re means to hamper minds in their 

 advance towards knowledge, especially since there can be (this I 

 will ask to be allowed to assume) no tribunal of authority set 

 up whose infallibility in distinguishing truth from error can 

 possibly be guaranteed. And so far as we are dealing merely 

 with speculation on morality, the same arguments as can be 

 brought forward in favour of allowing a general freedom to 

 express all sorts of opinion will apply in respect of morality 

 also. But it is and, one may say, is universally held to be, a 

 different matter when we come to social conduct. It is doubtful 

 whether there is anyone, even among those who are most 

 unw^illin_^ to >_^iant the existence of any limits to the right to 

 enjoy freedom of action in accordance with Conscience, who 

 does not draw the line somewhere. 



One may disguise this from oneself by saying that Conscience 

 cannot enjoin certain actions ; but in so saying one has assumed 

 at a certain point that ability in themselves always to distinguish 



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