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CLEMENT C. J. WEBB, ESQ.^ OX 



knowledge from opinion in others which, as we saw, cannot be 

 conceded to any person or body of persons without investing 

 them with the prerogative of infallibility. Unable — and, if what 

 I said above is true — unable from the very nature of the case, 

 to give an external criterion of rightness any more than of truth, 

 the champions of Liberty of Conscience are apt to fall back upon 

 the subjective criterion of what is called Conscientiousness. 

 Xow it is no doubt true that insincerity has no claim to be 

 respected in this matter. Insincerity is the negation of Con- 

 science, for the insincere assertor of a view not only does not 

 Icnoio it to be true, in the sense in which that may be affirmed of 

 anyone who only th uik-s it to be so, but he knoics that he neither 

 knows nor, properly speaking, even thinks so. But the doctrine 

 that all sincc/r I (/-held opinion is entitled to be free to take effect, 

 cannot be maintained, as is well known, without great difficulty. 

 And, to say the truth, the ordinary man means by a conscientious 

 opinion — or objection — something more than a sincerely-held 

 one. This is, I think, shown by the fact that everybody feels 

 that there is something absm'd in the attitude inevitably taken 

 up by the law, where the rights of the conscientious objector 

 are recognized, for which proof that the objection is iwt insincere 

 is a sufficient proof of its conscientiousness. TVlien one hears of 

 a conscientious objection " to vaccination, one naturally thinks 

 at once of some such scruple at the use of human means of 

 defence against disease as is, or was, I believe, entertained by 

 the Peculiar People ; and however unreasonable we may con- 

 sider such a scruple to be, one feels that the ™lation of a 

 rehgious scruple which one does not share may be the first 

 step on an inclined plane ending in the auto-da-fe, and is not to 

 be taken without serious hesitation. But quite inevitably, as I 

 said, the protection afforded to a religious scruple has to be 

 extended to a sincere conviction based on argument, such as one 

 school of medical practitioner would use against another, to 

 show that the process involves a risk to health sufficient to out- 

 weigh the chances of protection which it offers from a worse 

 disease. Such a conviction may no doubt be more reasonable in 

 the eyes of most of us, whether we share it or not, than the 

 scruples of the Peculiar People. But it is obviously not what 

 one would naturally mean by a " conscientious objection." It 

 lacks the association with rehgion which that phrase undoubtedly 

 carries with it. That such an association with religion is 

 commonly connoted by the expression, is attested by the difficulty 

 experienced by members of the Tribunals set up under the 

 recent Militarv Service Act in dealinfj with " conscientious 



