148 



CLEMENT C. J. WEBB^ ESQ., ON 



You will remember Charles Lamb's severe essay on Unitarian 

 Protests ; protests, that is, which were left by some Unitarians of 

 his day in the vestry after being married by a clergyman of the 

 Church of England, directed against the Trinitarian formula 

 used in the Slarriage Service of that Church. Had these 

 protesters taken the stronger line which Lamb would have 

 persuaded them to take, and been married by a rite of their own, 

 risking the penalties of illegality, we could have sympathized 

 with their action, I think, on a ground similar to that on which 

 we saw we could symp.ithize with the Quaker's refusal to swear 

 in a court of justice. Dissent, we should feel, from the doctrine 

 of the Trinity, raises after all no presumption whatever that the 

 dissenter means less or other bv marriao-e than the mass of his 

 fellow-citizens. Once the question is raised, it is plainly seen 

 to be unfair to hamper a fundamental right of citizenship with 

 the obligation to profess agreement with the majority of one's 

 fellow-citizens on an issue quite irrelevant to the business in hand. 



But the conscientious objection of which we have lately 

 heard most, that to military service, is surely quite wrongly 

 classed with the Quaker's to the oath and the Unitarian's to the 

 Anglican Marriage Service. Assuming the State to be really in 

 danger of destruction by a foreign foe, a citizen who refuses to 

 take his share in its defence is declining a fundamental duty of 

 citizenship implied in the common understanding on which the 

 existence of the State depends. This is so quite independently 

 of the totally different question which has sometimes been 

 confused with it, the question, namely, whether the permanent 

 establishment of conscription or some other form of compulsory 

 military service is the best method for guaranteeing the security 

 of the State in time of need. The out-and-out objector to 

 combatant service, w^hether Quaker or no — as distinct from the 

 mere political opponent of conscription — is not, like the Quaker 

 who insists upon affirming instead of swearing, doing in sub- 

 stance exactly what the State asks of him, and merely scrupling 

 at a particular form which has become traditionally attached to 

 the dointr of it. He is, in fact — or should be, if lie understood 

 his true position — resigning all claim to the protection of the 

 State, and making himself — for Conscience' sake, no doubt — an 

 outlaw. He has no further claim upon the State. He cannot 

 protest in the name of Liberty of Conscience when treated as a 

 criminal. He may be a martyr for righteousness, but a victim 

 of tyranny he is not. Hegel says quite rightly that only 

 because a State is strong, so that it can dispense with their 

 service and feels itself in no danger from their propaganda, can 



