118 PROFESSOR H. LANGHORKE ORCHARD, M.A., B.SC, ON 



and discerns truths deduced from First Principles. This is the 

 I Reason which deals with knowledge, controlling and governing 

 ^ those emotions and appetites that are impulses to human action^ 

 and so producing virtue — a harmony of the soul. Pure Reason, 

 ^ as wfll as Reasoning, makes use of hypotheses (which are ten- 

 I tative conceptions of the Idea that is being sought) ; but 

 §• Reasoning never gets further than hypotheses, whereas Pure 

 Reason arrives at direct apprehension of the first principle or 

 Idea. Thus the conclusions of Reasoning — mere Reasoning — 

 never rise higher than Opinion (which, true or false, is a matter 

 of persuasion only), whereas those of Pure Reason, avouched 

 by logical demonstration with direct intuition, present the 

 certainty belonging to Knowledge. If Ideas were not realities, 

 cognition would be impossible. 



Opinion, even though true, is comparable to artificial Ught 

 which shows us but indistinctly the reflections and shadows of 

 ^ the Ideas as perceived in sense objects which, by reminiscence, 

 E suggest and recall them. But Knowledge resembles the light 

 |- of the sun which shows things perspicuously and plainly. True 

 § opinion may belong to any man, but intellection is the privilege 

 ? of only a few men. A Definition (X0709) of a class is the image 

 (eliccbv) of its Idea, and includes all we can discover about the 

 class from observation ; the Idea includes all there is to be 

 known about it. Hamilton (" Discussions ") remarks that the 

 word, as employed by Plato, expresses " the real forms of the 

 intelhgible world, in lofty contrast to the unreal images of the 

 sensible." Tiberghien says that " according to the Platonic 

 sense, adopted by Kant and Cousin, ideas are, as it were, the 

 essence and matter of our intelligence, they are its primitive 

 elements, and at the same time the immediate objects of its 

 activity. They are the primary anticipations which the mind 

 brings to all its cognitions, the principles and laws by reason of 

 which it conceives of beings and things. The mind does not 

 create ideas, it creates by means of ideas." (Essai des Connais, 



^ Socrates and Plato at first restricted their theory to such 

 o Z, ideas as they judged to be " worthy." Moral and intellectual 

 ideas, e.g., justice, courage, beauty, were " worthy " ; but 

 -^^many other ideas were "unworthy." Socrates being asked 

 g^p. (in " Parmenides ") whether he admits ideas of physical things- 

 P ^ such as man, fire, water, answers : " There I have often felt a 

 ^ difficulty." And to the further inquiry : And of such things 



