124 PROFESSOR H. LAKGHOWNE ORCHARD, M.A., B.SC, ON 



te Quality. To Plato the Ideas were Substances, incorporeal it is 

 ^ true, but yet Substances, which can be added together* after 

 g the fashion of material objects, the resulting substance being 

 f greater than any of the component substances. Aristotle seems 

 § to have detected this error. To his keen insight, the affirmation 

 E " that motion, or that smallness, is a thing in itself, set up in 

 ^ nature, is a hard saying." This will also be our opinion. It is 

 § easy to see that the doctrine of Kealism may lead to absurdity : — 

 Let A and B be two equals, and let smallness be taken from A 

 and added to B. Then, since smallness is a " substance," 

 B plus smallness is greater than A minus smallness ; whereas 

 it is really less, for smallness has been added to it. Similarly, 

 let A, B, be two equal truths, each containing also some error ; 

 and let the error be taken from A and added to B. Then, since 

 error is a " substance," B is now greater than A ; whereas it is 

 really less, for error has been added to it. Other cases can 

 be examined in the same way. Plato's knowledge of Algebraic 

 ideas appears to have been but slight. He saw that contrary 

 ideas refuse to combine, but apparently assumed that they could 

 peacefully coexist, e.g., that greatness and smallness are not 

 irreconcilable opponents. Had he been acquainted with the 

 meaning and use of the symbols + and — , he might have steered 

 his theory clear of this Scylla of Reahsm. 



Where Plato's profound and keen intellect has failed of success, 

 it may be thought presumption in me to attempt. Yet, encourag- 

 g ing myself with the adage " Fortune favours the bold," I am 

 *J wishful to submit to the intelHgent criticism of this philosophical 

 % Society a theory of my own which, in my judgment, avoids the 

 g difficulties connected with that which we have been investigating, 

 o The main question relating to Ideas is — What do we mean ? 

 or, What ought we to mean ? when we speak of a Quality. 

 Philosophers and thinkers generally have with remarkable 

 unanimity shirked committing themselves to a strict definition. 

 In the knowledge of the character of a thing or a person we 

 know that thing or that person — their character tells what they 

 are. Now character is the resultant of (all the) quahties ; if we 

 knew all the qualities and their combination, we should know 

 the character, and thus the possessor of the character. There- 

 fore, the knowledge of one or more qualities is to that extent 



* By *' participation." Plato's theory is here self-contradictory, since 

 participation is impossible in that which has no parts. 



