12 



JUDGE GEOKGE H. SMITH^ ON 



speak of a crooked straight line, or round square. " For," as he 

 says, " whensoever an affirmation is false, the two names of 

 which it is composed, put together and made one, signify 

 nothing at all." 



Juridical and Non-Juvidical Rights. 



Hence, also, the distinction sometimes made between moral 

 and legal rights is to be regarded as inadmissible. For a legal 

 right, if it be a right at all, must also be a moral right ; and 

 such a right would be nothing more than what is more 

 appropriately called a juridiccd, as distinguished from a non- 

 juridical right. (Authorities cited R & L., pp. 161, 185.) 

 But, in fact, as the distinction is commonly used, the quality 

 of rectitude is ignored, and legality regarded as the sole 

 essential element. But this is not merely to vary the sense 

 of a term, which is often legitimate, but to suhstitiUe a new 

 and contradictory sense, with the effect, or proposed effect, of 

 displacing the proper sense, and thus eradicating the notion 

 expressed by the term. Accordingly, to those who use this 

 distinction, the jus primae noctis, referred to by Blackstone 

 (2 Com. 283), would, if allowed, be a true right ; or, to vary 

 the expression, the execution of Socrates, and of the innu- 

 merable martyrs who have suffered under cruel laws, would 

 be just. 



Natural and Legal Rights. 



So, too, I regard the distinction between natural and legal 

 rights as at least inappropriate. For, as will presently be more 

 fully explained, all rights originate in events, of which human 

 acts constitute the most conspicuous class ; and among these 

 are included the acts of government officials, legislative, 

 judicial and administrative. But these are but acts, not 

 differing from others except in the rights vested in their 

 authors; and, therefore, like other human acts, they constitute 

 mere facts or elements of the problems presented in Juris- 

 prudence. From the standpoint of Jurisprudence, therefore, 

 all rights are natural rights ; and there cannot be a right of 

 any other kind. Thus, for example, a right arising from the 

 contract, grant, tort, or other act, of a private individual, is 

 admittedly a natural right. But between such a right, and a 

 right arising from an act or acts of legislation, which are but 

 the acts of men vested with the right of legislation, there is, in 

 this regard, no discernible essential difference. In either case, 

 the right has its origin in the act, and its cause in the right of 



