THE THEORY OF JURISPRUDENCE. 



15 



at length in the essay cited in the note ; of which, so far as may 

 be necessary, I propose here to avail myself. But, as the 

 subject is an extensive one, only those points will be touched 

 upon which are essential to the consideration of the problems 

 proposed for discussion. 



The first two subjects {Persons and Things) are adequately 

 treated in the works of the classical jurists, whose views have 

 been generally adopted. " But," it is said by Ortolan, " the idea 

 of the share of the last mentioned {i.e., Events), is the work of 

 modern analysis," and this, I suppose, is true. The three notions 

 are described by the same author, as " the elements jorodiicing 

 law"; and in this he is right. For there is implied in the 

 notion of a right three things : A person in whom the right is 

 vested, or the oivner of the right ; the thing in, or over which 

 the right exists, which constitutes what may be called the 

 subject of the right ; and the event, or series of events in which 

 the right originated. For all rights originate in some event or 

 events ; nor can they be terminated or modified by any other 

 means. Hence the three notions, Persons, Things, and Events, 

 together with the notions of Liberty, and of Eightness or 

 Eectitude, involved in the definition of a right, constitute the 

 peculiar subject-matter of Jurisprudence ; and from these 

 notions and their mutual relations, all the principles of 

 Jurisprudence are to be derived. 



The subjects of Persons and that of Things are sufficiently 

 familiar, and further remarks on them may be omitted. 



The subject of Juridical Events is less familiar, but their 

 nature and kinds may be sufficiently presented by the following 



"Table of Juridical Events," 



Accidents : 



" Acts 



Actus Dei. 



Res inter alios acta. 



Public Acts. 

 Customs. 

 Political Acts. 



Legislative. 



Judicial. 



Administrative. 



