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JCTDOE GEORGE H. SMITH, ON 



I had no opportunity of reading the paper before coining into 

 this room and do not feel able to say much on such a learned 

 production as this. It certainly seemed to take the view that law- 

 was not law if it were not in accord with Justice, and though it did 

 not state what right and justice were, it clearly assumed that they 

 exist. The moral doctrine of Kant in his Ethics is nearly perfect, 

 but the corollary should be added that the existence of a Power 

 other than ourselves which makes for righteousness in the universe 

 accounts for the sense of right and wrong in man. He held a thing 

 to be right if it were for the benefit of the greatest number. Kant's 

 principle was simply this : you must not selfishly make yourself the 

 exception to a rule which is necessary for the well-being of society. 

 Society would come to an end if everyone lied or stole, therefore 

 we must not lie or steal. There is no law in human alfairs without 

 the action of the intellect, which frames, and carries out the law. 

 The same must be true all through nature, therefore add this 

 conception of a Moral Euler to Kant's principle, and you have a 

 clear basis for morals. 



Colonel Mackinlay proposed a hearty vote of thanks to the 

 learned Judge for his most useful paper. This was seconded by 

 Mr. Horner and carried with acclamation. 



Subsequently, and after reading the discussion, the Author 

 writes, — I am much gratified by the concurrence of some of the 

 speakers in the general views of my essay ; and I feel equally 

 obliged for the criticisms that have been made. For with these, or 

 rather with the general views expressed in them, I am generally in 

 accord ; and I find they will serve to illustrate certain aspects of my 

 theory ; which may thus, perhaps, be made somewhat clearer. 



I quite agree with Mr. Corrie that the commandment — " Thou 

 shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," — comprehends the whole 

 of the Law; which, in the only sense of the term I regard as 

 permissible for the jurist, it will be remembered, is but another 

 name for justice. But I cannot concur, in the conclusion, appar- 

 ently drawn : That " the old jurisprudence (in the sense of the 

 essay) tends to become inadequate as a moral basis for modern 

 (English) Law." 



If, however, this be intended — as I suppose it is — merely as a 

 protest against the theory, that the function of the state is confined 

 to the administration of justice, and to such matters as are essential 



