THE THEORY OF JURISPRUDENCE. 



29 



thereto, I have nothing to say against it. For, on this point, in my 

 own opinion — which I think accords with the better opinion of jurists 

 — Aristotle has said the last word: " The State is founded that men 

 may live, but is continued that they may live well." 



Assuming this to be the case, and that the functions of the state 

 extend to the promotion of the welfare of the people in other ways 

 than by the mere administration of justice, the power to do so will 

 be included among the rights of the state ; of which Jurisprudence 

 will take cognizance as it does of the rights of individuals. Hence 

 if it be right for the state to perform the functions alluded to by 

 Mr. Corrie, and similar functions, its right to do so will be affirmed 

 by the principles of Jurisprudence ; and, thus, whatever view be 

 taken of specific questions, it will — if rightly taken — find an 

 adequate " moral basis," in Jurisprudence, as conceived -by the 

 author, and indeed by jurists generally. 



Mr. Browne is right in supposing that my fundamental view of 

 Jurisprudence is, that the Law {i.e., the Positive, as distinguished 

 from the Instituted Law) is but another name for Justice or Right. 

 This, as I have said, I regard as the only sense of the term, the Law, 

 admissible for the jurist ; and under the latter name, I include 

 lawyers and all others who would treat the Instituted Law scientifi- 

 cally. He is also right in supposing that I assume the existence of 

 a Justice paramount to Human Convention and Institution; which, 

 according to the views expressed in the essay, is the only Justice 

 entitled to the name. But the suggestion is made — if I understand 

 him aright — that I have failed to explain the philosophical principles 

 " upon which legal rights rest and are enforceable." 



In reply, I would say that the paper read before the Society is but 

 an outline of the essay as originally submitted, where this aspect of 

 the subject is treated more at length ; and where, I think, or at least 

 hope, I have made it clear that the fundamental principle of Juris- 

 prudence is the right of Personal Liberty or Self-Ownership. From 

 this — as I attempted to show in the original essay, and in the essays 

 and works there cited — all other kinds of rights are logically 

 deducible, or rather are mere applications. 



The theory there developed — which may conveniently be called 

 the "Theor}^ of Human Autonomy" — is involved in Hobbes' 

 definition of a right as consisting in " that liberty which every man 

 has to use his natural faculties according to right reason." 



