TEE THEORY OF JUfllSPRUDENCE. 



31 



leaveth us " ; " For nothing is signified by the word, right, than 

 that liberty which every man has to use his natural faculties 

 according to right reason"; "Right consisteth in liberty to door 

 forbear." {De Corpore Politico, B. 2, Ch. 10, §5; Leviathan, B. 1, 

 Ch. 14.) 



This difference of expression, however, does not indicate any 

 substantial dissent on my part from the views of Professor Orchard, 

 with which, if I understand him rightly, I entirely agree. " Right 

 (as denoting conformity to the moral standard) and Rights (I agree) 

 are not identical." But there is a clearly defined relation between 

 them, expressed in the proposition that " every true right has its 

 basis in Right," as thus defined ; and to use the mathematical 

 expression, the one term is a function of the other. Also I agree, 

 that all rights " spring from the application of the Divine Law to 

 the Natural and Social relations of men regarded as moral agents " ; 

 and that if in case of supposed "right," this application be 

 erroneous, the so-called " right " is not a true " right." But this is 

 but, perhaps, a more forcible expression of the distinction I make 

 between rights, i.e., real rights, and quasi rights ; and the correspond- 

 ing distinction between Law and Quasi Law. 



It may be observed, also, that I use the term. Right, not only in 

 the two senses above noted, i.e., as a collective term denoting rights 

 in the aggregate, and as denoting conformity to the moral standard, 

 but, also, as denoting the aggregate of the principles by which rights 

 are determined. In this sense, the term is equivalent to Justice or 

 the Law, and this is in accord with modern usage, where the term. 

 Right, or its equivalent, is used as the name of the Law, as, e.g.y 

 when we speak of the Law, as Common Right, Jus Co/mmme, Rechty 

 Droit, Diritto, Derecho, etc. This implies an essential relation between 

 Jurisprudence and Ethics or Morality, but does not confound the 

 two. It simply implies that, according to the views expressed in 

 the essay, Jurisprudence is a department, and an essential part of 

 Morality. 



In conclusion, referring to the suggestion of the Chairman, I 

 would say that the use of a common law, by this country and 

 England, and the English colonies, is not merely evidence of the 

 strong bond of union between these peoples, but, as explained in 

 my original essay (pp. 55 to 58 inclusive), that it is a most signi- 

 ficant phenomenon, altogether irreconcilable with the conception of 



