F. F. KOGET, ON ERNEST NAVILLE^S LIFE. 



197 



Cartesian sense, nor a sensationalist in the eighteenth century 

 fashion, which agreed well with the spiritual unconcern of 

 Naville for pure rationalism. As an editor of Maine de Biran, 

 Naville completed and improved upon Cousin's contribution to 

 the exposition of his doctrine. 



With Naville, metaphysics became a principal but not the 

 principal pursuit. In his mind, metaphysics were, on tlie 

 one hand, second to the relationship of man to God, and^ 

 on the other, he beheld in the sciences a primary object for the 

 exercise of the metaphysical faculty. 



i'rom this height he surveyed all sciences. " There can be 

 no contradiction between the particular sciences and philosophy," 

 he writes, " since the results yielded by every particular science 

 are the pabulum of philosophic thought. Such thought would 

 be purposeless that did not formulate its statements in full 

 view of the sum total of the data of experience, observation 

 and experiment." Consequently, he launched upon the world, 

 from 1883, La physique moderne, La logique de Fhypothese, Les 

 philosophies negatives, and lastly, for the book bears the imprint 

 1909, Les philosophies affirmatives. For Naville, the ptrincipium 

 of the universe is an everlasting spirit, a creative essence free 

 from Determinism — which he condemns in the book, Le litre 

 arhitre. Thus, the philosophy of Naville comes throughout into 

 contact with the mighty doctrine of the Evangelists and 

 Apostles. 



He defined philosophy — the share of reason in the search 

 after God. For him, faith and reason could not fairly be 

 considered to oppose each other : a philosophy, and a religion 

 might be mutually exclusive, but religion and philosophy could 

 not. When once the human mind comes to the conclusion that 

 the traditional data of Christianity offer the best solution of 

 philosophic problems, it must follow that philosophy and 

 religion are in harmony, though distinct. 



The dictates of the moral conscience ISTaville applied also to 

 the attainment of justice in politics. This he held to consist in 

 the representation of ideas — consequently of the parties holding 

 them — in political assemblies, but not in governments. He 

 thus became identified with what is called proportional 

 representation — or representation of minorities and majorities 

 in proportion to the suffrages polled by each and every party. 

 His proposals found much favour in Switzerland, falling into 

 line as they did with those put forward by my uncle, the 

 historian Amedee Eoget, and by Professor Hagenbach-Bischoff, 

 of Bale. Many imitators and disciples have, in this work too, 



