41 



are yet trying to come at the trutli, and are holding fast by scientific men 

 and scientific truths, while at the same time they hold fast by us with all 

 the spiritual sympathies of their nature. I think it is of infinite advantage 

 that such men should come before us, and that they should read such papers 

 as the one which has been brought before us this evening. (Cheers.) 



Eev. C. A. Row'. — I feel greatly indebted to Mr. Henslow for this paper, 

 as I think it is the most important paper we have had for some time, 

 although we may not agree with all its conclusions. In the first place, it is 

 important, inasmuch as it shows plainly that it is possible to hold a doctrine 

 of development, and yet to be a strict theist and a true Christian. This is a 

 matter of considerable importance, for many people in controversy with 

 unbelievers and atheists represent that you cannot hold such views and be 

 a theist or a Christian, though I have always maintained that that is a great 

 mistake. I want now to make a few observations for the purpose of improv- 

 ing rather than controverting the paper, and in doing so, I will not touch 

 upon evolution at all, for I think the paper is far more valuable in reference 

 to the " design argument." I wish Mr. Henslow had put more prominently 

 at the beginning of his paper what he intended to lay down in the con- 

 cluding paragraph, viz., all those points which prove mind. My idea of the 

 design argument is that it should embrace all those things which prove mind 

 as distinguished from mere action, law or order, or chance. I think the term 

 " design" is exceedingly unfortunate, because it is so united in the public 

 mind with the idea of utility that it has led to much confusion of thought. 

 The adaptation of means to ends, as well as order and arrangement, prove 

 the presence of mind, and yet they may not be strictly utilitarian. Take a 

 point not elaborated in this paper — the presence of order. That, to my think- 

 ing, unquestionably proves the presence of mind, and yet it may not be an 

 order of the kind which belongs to utility. Here is an illustration : Suppose 

 I write a book, and come to that unpleasant part of the work which involves 

 revision and the writing of much of it over again. I get angry and tear up 

 the paper, and the room gets into confusion. I go out of that room for a 

 time, and on going back again, find that the whole place has been rearranged, 

 but not at all in conformity with my ideas of useful design. Yet I 

 recognize the presence of order, from which I infer that a mind has 

 been in that room during my absence, although some of its operations are 

 not very agreeable to me, for I cannot make use of the order which I find 

 there. It is an order, in fact, which is not my order. Now take an 

 illustration of the diff'erence between this and chance. Two or three 

 years ago I wrote a paper for this Institute, when a storm occurred, and 

 blew many of my papers out of the window. They were recovered in a sad 

 condition, — several lacuna occurred in the proof, which I was requested to 

 fill in, and I found it very difficult to fit the words so as exactly to fill 

 the empty spaces. This was the result of the action of blind law on 

 unconscious matter, and it shows that mind had nothing to do in the 

 operation. If, then, the presence of order is a proof to me of the pre- 

 sence of mind, although it may not be directly connected with the idea 



