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separable from it, whicli he denies. True, lie does not here use 

 the word power/'' in speaking of Force, but says " that which 

 produces : still he must mean power, because he does not 

 believe matter or mind to be Force ; but these are they that 

 produce motion, and as they are not force, he can only mean 

 that they possess the power to produce motion, which power is 

 named Force. This is confirmed by another sentence, in which 

 he says, " the term has a potential meaning, to depart from 

 which would be to render language unintelligible.^' 



0. Nevertheless, after having asserted that Force is a power, 

 that it produces motion, is inseparable from matter, is an active 

 principle, &c., he actually says that it is only an " abstract or 

 generalized expression.-" These are wholly incompatible; a 

 generalization cannot produce motion, and is not only separable 

 from matter, but has no relation to it, being the product of mind 

 alone. To call force a mere useful generalization, is to deprive 

 it of all potential meaning, " and therefore to render his own 

 language unintelligible ; he must consequently be understood 

 as indicating by it an active principle inseparable from 

 matter.'^ 



6. Many writers agree with Mr. Grove in his statement that 

 force is a generalized expression ; that antecedence and conse- 

 quence are all that can be predicated of phenomena, we adding 

 nothing to our knowledge by the affirmation of power, or by say- 

 ing that these phenomena are produced by something. Not to 

 dwell on the fact that all their reasonings about the persistence 

 of force, &c., are wholly inconsistent with this hypothesis, we feel 

 at once its discordance with the utterances of consciousness. 

 We are conscious of power in ourselves, the power to originate 

 our own volitions. We cause, we produce, we call into existence 

 that which but for our agency would not have existed. We are 

 conscious that our volitions are not uncaused successive hap- 

 penings in our mental history, but the immediate results of our 

 own mental power. Power, therefore, is predicated of a 

 conscious personal agent only. Hence it is that our first 

 judgments of causation relate to ourselves originating our 

 volitions. We are causes, our volitions are eflPects. All other 

 effects produced by us are produced not immediately, as are 

 our volitions, but mediately or instrumentally. Hence it is that 

 our first judgment of secondary causation must refer to the 

 relation between volition and some of its constituted sequents. 

 Having gained the notion of power, in the consciousness of our 

 self-personality, we then, in perfect accordance with a well- 

 known law of thought, transfer this notion, first to our 

 volitions, and ultimately to material realities. For example, 

 before us is lying a quantity of gunpowder. Is not the con- 



