104 



the feelings belong. Who, then, are we? How can we have/^ 

 if we do not exist? — and Mr. Bray says we do not, for force 

 is all. Had he said we are feelings, and feelings are force, and 

 force is all, he would have been consistent ; but, as it is, his 

 language is meaningless. " Force is all that is the assumption ; 

 consequently, we are not we, for force is not personal — feelings 

 are not feelings, for force is not conscious — ideas are not ideas, 

 for force is not reflective — mental attributes are not mental 

 attributes, for force has no mind ; and so on with almost any 

 quality or attribute that could be named. And this is the 

 vaunted science of the nineteenth century, before which Moses 

 must hide his diminished head ! 



10. Again he writes, — " We find, then, but one thing in the 

 world — Force ; and what is that ? Force and Power are the 

 same, and Power we cannot separate from that source of all 

 power — from God; Power is God. We say ' the power of God,' 

 as if it could be separated from him, or delegated ; but this is 

 clearly inconceivable. The one only thing we find anywhere is 

 God.'' It does not in the least follow that because we speak 

 of the power of God, power can therefore be separated from 

 God ; we mean that it is an attribute of God, but is not 

 itself God. When we speak of the thought of a man, we 

 do not thereby imply that the thought may be separated from 

 the man, even while he communicates it to others ; and still les= 

 do we mean that the thought is the man, 



11. According, however, to Mr. Bray, " Force is all/^ and God 

 is all. Consequently, Force and God are convertible terms. 

 Force might be substituted for God in all worship, and all 

 religions. His language, however, is so confused and contra- 

 dictory, that it would be impossible to construct any consistent 

 system from it, or rather it might be quoted in support of any 

 conceivable system. In one place, he says that force is all ; 

 and then on the next page he speaks of " every atom pulling 

 at every other atom.'' In one place he says there is nothing 

 underlying phenomena, and yet again speaks of an intelligent 

 substance, which substance is atomic, which atoms are force. 

 Such writing, while it does not need refutation, does need 

 exposure. 



12. The utterances of Professor Huxley on this point are not 

 much more satisfactory, although they do cut away all the 

 ground from Materialism, properly so called. In his lecture 

 on Descartes, he says, — When the Materialists stray beyond 

 the borders of their path, and begin to talk about there being 

 nothing else in the universe but matter and force, and necessary 

 laws, and all the rest of their ' grenadiers,' I decline to follow them . 

 I remind you that we have already seen clearly and distinctly, 



