105 



nnd in a manner which admits of no doubt^ that all our know- 

 ledge is a knowledge of our states of consciousness. ' Matter ' 

 and ' Force ^ are^ so far as we can know, mere names for certain 



forms of consciousness Thus it is an indisputable truth 



that w^hat we call the material world is only known to us under 

 the forms of the ideal world ; and, as Descartes tells us, our 

 knowledge of the soul is more intimate and certain than our 

 knowledge of the body. If I say that impenetrability is a 

 property of matter, all that I can really mean is that the 

 consciousness I call extension, and the consciousness I call 

 resistance, constantly accompany one another. Why and how 

 they are thus related is a mystery. And if I say that thought 

 is a property of matter, all that I can mean is that, actually or 

 possibly, the consciousness of extension, and that of resistance 

 accompany all other sorts of consciousness. But, as in the former 

 case, w^hy they are thus associated is an insoluble mystery.^^ 



13. The Professor, in the first place, here confuses knowledge 

 and consciousness. As Mr. Moore expresses it, — When the 

 conscious certainty which accompanies a given thought is 

 determined by the constituted laws of intelligence, that thought 

 is a knowledge.^' We know matter, force, extension, and 

 resistance as externals to self, but we are not conscious of them. 

 We are conscious only of thoughts, feelings, and volitions. It 

 does not follow that our knowledge of soul is more intimate 

 than our knowledge of body, because we are conscious of self, 

 but not of matter ; or because the material world is only known 

 to us under the forms of the ideal world. Our knowledge of 

 matter, with its powers and qualities, is as certain as our con- 

 sciousness of self, because both are equally determined by the 

 constituted laws of intelligence. I have as much right to deny 

 the existence of self possessing the power of willing, as I have 

 to deny the substantial existence of matter possessing the 

 power called Force ; that is, I have no logical right to deny 

 either. 



14. Professor Huxley's reasoning would land us in the purest 

 idealism, absorbing matter, force, and even God himself ; but a 

 true philosophy of consciousness will save us from this most 

 unscientific and undesirable result. 



15. There may be some excuse for all this haziness of thought 

 if Mr. Spencer's supposition be true, — that force, as the 

 " ultimate of ultimates,'' is especially inscrutable. No doubt, 

 force in its ultimate nature is inscrutable, but not more so than 

 any other power in existence. The only explanation we can 

 give is, that they are all the result of the will of an Almighty 

 Creator. But Mr. Spencer, like Professor Huxley, seems to con- 

 fuse the facts of consciousness with the affirmations of our neces- 



YOL. YII. I 



