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is that which is found in the Moral sense. This^ then, must 

 be our subject for the present occasion. Popular philosophy- 

 gathers round this peculiar capacity of man, on the one hand 

 in hostility to its peculiarity, and on the other hand in defence. 

 Let us see how the conflict goes. 



We may place one of ourselves as the instance of humanity 

 under review. We stand, as it were, outside this individual, 

 and with whatever openings and light we can command we 

 endeavour to look within, so as to discover one, at least, of his 

 grand characteristics. Specially, we wish to find out that 

 element of his being in which he is moveable by the true and 

 the right. This is properly his Moral sense. 



The man is material, and may be controlled mechanically. 

 He is animal, and may be ruled, as other animals are, by 

 affections of his merely animal nature. Is the man more than 

 can be expressed by material and animal^' ? Like most 

 animals, man is social, and may be moved by considerations 

 arising out of certain of his relations to his fellow- creatures. 

 He may be moved by considerations of this kind of a very 

 lofty character ; such as respect his country, his race, and 

 even the universe at large, with the Great Father at its head. 

 Yet in all this he differs in degree, rather than in kind, from 

 the lower creatures. Has he any capacity by which he may 

 be moved and regulated when not only no mechanical force is 

 applied, but, also, when no merely animal or social element of 

 his being can be addressed ? 



When we are in search of that which is generically distinct in 

 the capacities of man, as a creature capable of being governed, 

 we find ourselves, by careful thought, carried entirely beyond 

 all ideas of personal, social, and even universal safety and 

 comfort, into another region altogether. Every action that is 

 right may appear also to be useful — if the sweep of thought 

 connected with it be wide enough, it will, no doubt, always 

 appear useful as well as right, — but that same '^if ■'^ implies a 

 great deal. In the vast majority of minds there is no such 

 sweep of thought as is implied in the perception of the 

 utility of all that is right. In these minds, in multitudes of 

 instances, there is nothing but the idea of right to go by. 

 May they be controlled when nothing but that idea affects 

 them ? May they be repelled when nothing but the idea of 

 wrong repels ? In other words, may a man appreciate the 

 maxim that he should never do wrongly, even that good may 

 come ? These questions direct us in our search for that which 

 is supremely moral in man, that, too, which supremely dis- 

 tinguishes him from the lower creation. Our moral constitu- 

 tion is not to be sought for in physiology, nor yet in our 



