191 



because it is the efifect of the optic ray. By keeping strictly 

 to this use of the word, we maintain a very decided advantage 

 in such an inquiry as the present. 



This moral sense has features that constrain us to class it 

 with the other senses. For example, it is aflfected by ideas of ^ 

 right and wrong ; so is the sense of hearing by harmony and 

 discord ; so are all the senses by that which distresses, as well 

 as by that which pleases. This sense, too, is useful to man, 

 as other senses are to their possessors. Like the feelers of an 

 insect or reptile, or the wings of a bat, by their delicate sensi- 

 bility of touch, enabling their possessors to find their way, so 

 does the keenly sensitive moral susceptibility enable its pos- 

 sessor to find the right path in action when his intelligence 

 as to that path is defective in a high degree. As the affections 

 of other senses constrain by the pleasure they give, or the 

 pain they inflict, so does this moral sense in man. Hence 

 it seems to me most important that it should be recognized 

 and cultivated, just as sight or any other sense, and even more 

 fully and carefully than all the rest put together. 



The true moral sensation is clearly and easily distinguishable 

 from all affections of the lower animals. It is utterly different 

 from the effect of approbation or its opposite, and also from 

 that of promised reward, or threatened punishment. Many of 

 the lower animals are susceptible of these effects, and very 

 keenly so. A dog, for example, is made to cower, and even 

 to run off and hide itself, when spoken to as having acted 

 wrongly ; and it shows signs of unquestionable gratification 

 when praised, as for a useful or noble action. This is more 

 readily mistaken for the action of a moral sense than the effect 

 of threats or promises of reward. But it is to be observed 

 that the dog is equally affected by the praise or blame, what- 

 ever be the right or wrong in the case. That simply shows 

 that he has neither the moral idea nor the capacity of feeling 

 in accordance with it. The moral sense is as distinct from the 

 susceptibility of praise and blame as hearing is from tasting, 

 or from any other sense. 



In saying this, we do not deny thought to the animal. That 

 in which one sensation is distinguished from another, so as to 

 make objects of a material nature affect what may be called 

 the lower mind, as objects j must be of the nature of thought, — 

 must, in fact, be reasoning. So far as there is evidence of this 

 in the lower creatures, it is unwise to deny it. But so is it 

 unwise to mistake such thought and reasoning, and the feeling 

 which results from it, for that thought in which true moral 

 distinctions are perceived, and the moral sense made evident. 

 Where there is no blame from others, nor the slightest idea 



