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and an inside^ or to tell liow an idea affects it as distinct from 

 tlie way in which it is affected, say by a state of the aural 

 nerve. While it is of vast importance to mark distinctions 

 when true differences exist, it is equally important to make 

 the most that truth allows of likenesses such as this. 



The moral sense is not the conscience. That is the judg- 

 ment when giving us the moral idea, or when showing us 

 right as distinguished from wrong ; but this is not a judgment 

 giving us an idea, but a capacity of feeling affected by the 

 idea when given. This distinction is, 1 think, of great 

 importance. The province of conscience is to judge so that 

 the true right shall be presented in the soul as the right, and 

 the real wrong as the wrong ; but the moral sense has no 

 more to do with such judging than the sense of hearing has to 

 do in determining the character of the sounds which fall upon 

 the ear. That which has in it as an idea the element of right 

 will produce in the soul having that idea the feeling appro- 

 priate to the right, whether the idea is true or false, just as a 

 certain state of the aural nerve will give the sensation of 

 hearing, though no actual sound is in the atmosphere at the 

 time ; and a certain state of the optic nerve will give the 

 sensation of seeing, though no light is falling upon the eye. 

 It is the work of conscience to decide whether the right is 

 real ; but the moral sense must feel in accordance with the 

 idea entertained, whether that right is real or unreal. 



It is interesting and important, even repeatedly, to trace in 

 some measure the likeness of the moral sense to the other 

 senses. One man does not hear so well as another ; so there 

 is great diversity of moral susceptibility among men. One 

 has the sense of hearing so keen that it is impossible for him 

 to be comfortable unless in the midst of silence ; another is 

 not affected amid deafening din ; so is it with the moral sense. \ 

 One is so easily affected by the least wrong, real or imaginary, 

 that he can scarcely be said to be fit to live under the ordinary 

 conditions of social life ; while another is unaffected even by 

 many and serious instances of iniquity. As sounds affect the 

 ear, whether emitted by ourselves or others, so do actions 

 in their moral character affect us, whether our own or those of 

 our fellow-men. As it does not at all affect the reality of 

 hearing, that sounds that are delightful to one are horrible to 

 others ; so it does not affect the reality of the moral sense that 

 men differ ever so widely in their feelings of what is right and 

 what is wrong. 



I am thus particular as to this sense in its true character, 

 because sufficient place is hardly given to it in the discussions 

 of morality, or, perhaps, I should rather say moral philosophy. 



