199 



in our supposed case, gain some feeling of rigHt and wrong or a 

 consciencc.-'^^ If I understand at all what the term right 

 truly means in moral discussions, ''^the public good^^ which 

 can be promoted by killing the individual who merely stands 

 in the way of it, and from no fault of his, has, and can have, 

 nothing in common with that meaning. It cannot be right to 

 promote such ^' good,^^ nor can it be wrong to abhor it. The 

 moral sense is just that capacity of feeling by which we are 

 shocked at such a representation of ^^good,''-' and the moral 

 idea is essentially that eternal thought which underlies that 

 capacity. 



It may be well to remark here that I do not find it possible 

 to cope with the more popular of philosophical errors while 

 adhering to the common use of certain terms, or even when 

 following in the beaten track of thought without deviation. It 

 is forced, I think, upon one who reasons impartially to observe 

 that the strongest points in sceptical argument are laid to the 

 sceptic^s hand by authors whose aim is directly opposed to 

 his. The Christian thinker is bound to consider this, and to 

 let go his own most cherished terms and notions, when false, 

 and fitted only to favour the foe. You will see the bearing of 

 this remark as I proceed. 



In seeking to clear our way more fully to the true moral 

 idea, we come strongly into collision with the too common 

 notion of instinct.^' Darwin says of the moral qualities, that 



their foundation lies in the social instincts,^-* including in this 

 term the family ties.-''' He says further, that ^' these instincts 

 are of a highly complex nature ; and, in the case of the lower 

 animals, give special tendencies towards certain definite actions; 

 but the more important elements for us are love and the 

 distinct emotion of sympathy, f It is, so to speak, the friction 

 caused by the crossing of instincts that gives rise to the idea 

 of ought,^^ or duty,^^ as Darwin views it. He says, Any 

 instinct which is permanently stronger or more enduring than 

 another, gives rise to the feeling which we express by saying 

 that it ought to be obeyed. A pointer dog, if able to reflect 

 on his past conduct, would say to himself, *'I ought^ (as, 

 indeed, we say of him) ' to have pointed at that hare, and not 

 have yielded to the passing temptation of hunting it.^ J 



What is really meant by instinct'^ in such connections as 

 these? The instinct'^ of pointing at the hare is contrasted 

 with the '^'^instinct^^ of hunting it. Why should we call these 

 ^^instincts^^ ? If we look into the mind of the dog by means 



* Descent of Man, yo\. i. ed. 1871, p. 73. f Ibid., vol. ii. p. 394. 



+ Ibid, p. 392. 



