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of any light which we can bring to bear upon it, we see, first 

 of all, certain sensations, then certain thougJits, and last, 

 certain volitions. We see all these states as surely as in any 

 mind among men. Why should we call their combination 

 ^' instincts ? The senses in at least some animals are keener 

 than in men ; the thoughts are much more rapid, as a rule ; 

 the volitions are more vigorous ; but that gives no ground for 

 calling their combinations by a name implying their blindness 

 or unaccountableness. Similar questions rise as to ^' love 

 and "sympathy'^ when called "instincts/^ Why, for example, 

 should the gregarious actions of either animals or of men be 

 called instincts^'' ? The sentinel of a flock has certain 

 sensations ; he sees an enemy approaching ; he has instantly 

 thoughts of danger ; he clearly thinks of the enemy's designs ; 

 he gives the well-known signal to the flock ; — why call all this 



instinct^^ ? Then the love of animals is as real as that of 

 man, and so is their sympathy; and both are as really the 

 results of thought. Both are the results of processes perfectly 

 well known to us through our own experience. Lay the states 

 of the animal soul out in all their variety, and value them at 

 their utmost; then search, not in something to which you 

 are blind, and which you call by an unmeaning name ; but in 

 the sensations, thoughts, and volitions of animal life, so as to 

 see if you can find anything that can be identified either with 

 the true moral idea, or with the true moral sense. If you find 

 it, then tell us that you have ; if you do not find it, then 

 cease to fancy it under the meaningless term of instinct.-*' 

 This alone is worthy of science. Conjecturings are offensive 

 when put in the place of good, honest facts, in the search for 

 what is^ not what may be imagined. 



But in following this matter we come to the ougJW of 

 Mr. Darwin's pointer dog. What does that mean ? As repre- 

 sented, it comes to nothing more than the difierence between 

 two instincts '' ! Perhaps he means two feelings — that of 

 desire to chase, and that of the desire to point. That to point, 

 it seems, is permanently the strongest, and the creature's 



ought means nothing more than a perception of the differ- 

 ence. Ought," then, really means nothing more than that 

 it is more comfortable in the long run to act in one way than 

 in another ! This is something all but infinitely different from 

 the meaning of that duty " which contemplates the loss of 

 being itself as preferable to the doing of 'wrong. We turn 

 with sorrow from the sad proof which Darwin furnishes of his 

 having lost the true thought in this momentous matter. 



Giving up altogether, then, the notion of instinct,'' we 

 come to that of intuitive " ideas, as giving explanation of 



