207 



case moves a limb in another case fails to do so. Volition is 

 an act of mind, motor changes are effects in matter_, and hence 

 Mr. Spencer's explanation of Will is more illusory than even 

 he imagines Freewill itself to be. He has a curious explana- 

 tion as to how we distinguish between voluntary and in- 

 voluntary movements. He says_, The difference between an 

 involuntary movement of the leg and a voluntary one is_, that 

 whereas the involuntary one takes place without any previous 

 consciousness of the movement to be made, the voluntary one 

 takes place only after it has been represented in conscious- 

 ness; and as the representation of it is nothing else than a 

 weak form of the psychical state accompanying the real move- 

 ment, it is nothing else than a nascent excitation of all the 

 nerves concerned which precedes their actual excitation.''^ 

 What is a truly involuntary movement of the leg ? If the limb 

 is moved by some one else than its possessor, we should say so 

 far the movement is involuntary. If the limb is convulsively 

 moved, whether the owner will or not, this also is involuntary. 

 But it is neither of these Mr. Spencer contemplates. He has 

 in view merely a case in which a man moves his limb without 

 thinking of his doing so. There is the volition, only there is 

 not the thought of it. Because there is no thought of it, 

 Mr. Spencer concludes it is non-existent ! He supplies us 

 himself with a perfect correction of his own mistake. In 

 speaking of Berkeley, he says that that author confounds the 

 having a sensation with the knoiuledge of having a sensation.'^ 

 Again, while the reception of a sensation may be a simple 

 undecomposable mental act, to observe the reception of a 

 sensation is decidedly a composite one. The knowledge of a 

 sensation so far from being an act of immediate consciousness, 

 presupposes a much-involved process." He goes on to 

 enlarge the same idea. Now, let us only put ^' volition " for 



sensation," and it is clear that Mr. Spencer simply confounds 

 the act of volition with the knowledge of our performing that 

 act. Mr. Spencer abundantly refutes his own explanation. 



This author has a remarkable piece of logic which he gives 

 as his strong reason for rejecting the dogma of Freewill." 

 He says, " Psychical changes either conform to law or they do 

 not. If they do not conform to law, this work, in common 

 with all works on the subject, is sheer nonsense : no science of 

 Psychology is possible. If they do conform to law, there 

 cannot be any such thing as Freewill." What does Mr. 

 Spencer mean here by " law " ? We learn from another 

 utterance. He says, Freewill, did it exist, would be entirely 



Principles of Psychology, p. 614. 



