209 



lie alone does anything that is done; that force which per- 

 forms the entire experiment is his own force. How is it that 

 he so completely forgets this truth ? His will, or he himself 

 in volition_, is the '^absolute commencement^^ of every change 

 that takes place ; yet he never once mentally refers to this 

 in all he says_, though speaking of " matter and force ! 

 According to his teaching, the matter arranges itself, divides 

 itself, unites itself ! though in every instance he gives that 

 initiatory motion which merely passes through certain changes 

 till it is balanced by other forces and then ceases. How 

 wonderfully (as we might put it) John Tyndall forgets John 

 Tyndall, and yet all the while speaks of him. He says I can 

 show you something.''^ Then he adds, I pour a little water 

 in which a crystal has been dissolved.-'^ He tells us that " all 

 force may be ultimately resolved into a push or a pull in a 

 straight line.'' ^ We thus learn that that which pushes or pulls 

 alone has force. Suppose that fifty people stood one behind 

 another, — the last man of the vow ]:mshes, the next to him is 

 pushed, and so on to the last. All are affected, but one only 

 has used /orce. So it is with all Dr. TyndalPs experiments, 

 as with those of every one else. However numerous and 

 interesting the changes are in matter which take place, the 

 experimenter dXouQ pushes ov pulls. He alone has the force. 

 It is only because he fails to consider his own personal 

 position in such experiments that he is involved in the far 

 more serious error of failing to recognize the actions of One 

 whose force is so much more vast ; and yet nothing can be 

 more palpable than the truth that mind alone is cause, and is 

 cause alone in ivill. 



This is the truth in which, so to speak, morality has its 

 foundation. The word has absolutely no meaning', if true 

 will is denied. Right and wrong have no meaning in a 

 necessitarian philosophy. If all is " invariable,^^ all is as it must 

 be, and hence it is absurd to say that anything is as it ought 

 not to be, or as it ought to be. Moral sense — moral idea — 

 moral anything — are phrases which express not even illusions 

 if all is necessary ; for then the illusions so-called are among the 

 necessary changes, and form part of the " benevolent whole ! 

 The ought of Mr. Darwin^ s pointer dog is unworthy of 

 even canine sagacity, if his hunting was necessary and his 

 pointing at the moment impossible ! Reason rebels at 

 the idea of changes being both moral and necessary, and 

 manhood scorns the ignorance which refuses to know. 

 The moral sense groans under the effect of those teachings 

 and actings that would, if successful, make its very existence 

 an ^' invariable blunder. We fall back, then, on the perfect 



