210 



freedom of the soul of man in its volitions^ and hence on one 

 grand element of tlie ideas of right and wrong-. 



It will be necessary now to show what is the other grand 

 element of that idea. I have already indicated that iitiUti/ 

 is not Tightness. A river flows for the general weal; a 

 tree grows for the same ; even a hill raises its head, and 

 catches the passing cloud for the same ; but no one will 

 call these moralities. The acts of insane persons often 

 produce great calamity, yet no one will call these immorali- 

 ties ! Mathematics are as much moral philosophy as ethics, 

 if we have no difference by which to mark them off but 

 utility. It is consequently absurd to speak of an " ethical 

 standard as found in the mere usefulness of action. 



There is a relation existing between minds and minds, and 

 between minds and things, and in that relation an order, the 

 declaration of which is 'perfect laiu. Free accordance with 

 that law, or, in other words, with that order, or, in still other 

 words, with that relation, is moral right. Free discordance, 

 moral wrong. This relation, order, law, forms the twin grand 

 element, along with true freedom in the moral idea. It is the 

 office of conscience to make sure of this accordance, and to 

 mark it off from all discordance ; while it is the office of the 

 moral sense to give force to the judgments of conscience. 



Let us look at the most important instance of what I mean. 

 There is a relation between man and God. No amount of 

 false thought can affect that relation. Even the most ardent 

 denial given to the very idea of his being, leaves that relation 

 untouched, as much so as does the most perfect faith. There 

 is an order which arises out of that relation which is as 

 unchangeable as itself. No conceivable subjective state, or 

 states, of the soul can modify that order in the least degree, 

 any more than the fancy of an enthusiast can produce the 

 perpetual motion. The relation makes a certain thing right 

 and another wrong, — in other words, a certain thing in order 

 and another out of order ; the law is simply the declaration of 

 that which is in order, and of that which is out of order, or 

 out of keeping,^^ as we say, w4th the relation. That man, 

 who depends, as he does, on God, and is treated as he is by 

 God, should supremely regard Him to whom he stands thus 

 related, is pure reason when considered as thought in the soul, 

 and true order, as it ever must be in reality, whether it is 

 thought of or not. 



Eelations similar (more or less) to this exist between man 

 and man, and between man and all other creatures; an order 

 similar (more or less) arises out of these relations ; true law 

 is just the declaration of that order. These relations are the 



