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But Mr. Spencer^s fallacies are palpable. What can be 

 more so than his confounding consciousness with knowledge,, 

 and unconsciousness with ignorance ? It is surely absurd to 

 hold that everything of which I am unconscious is unknown 

 to me, even if you take the word in the meaning which we 

 have already quoted as that of Professor Bain. If I am not at 

 a particular moment " conscious of a horse/^ it surely does 

 not follow that I am ignorant of all such quadrupeds. Is it 

 true that everything of which we are unconscious at the 

 moment is unknown to us ? If Mr. Spencer should 

 insist on holding ^^unconscious to be equivalent to un- 

 known/^ then what is the force of his " therefore ? He would 

 thus simply argue that what is unknown to us is unknown to 

 us ! And if there is a difference between the true meaning 

 of unconscious and ^' unknown/^ his reasoning is worth- 

 less ; for the one cannot logically follow as the necessary 

 consequence of the other. Then^ if an object is ^' unknown 

 to us^ does it follow that we " can have^^ no " evidence of its 

 existence'"' ? And is it ^'absurd to suppose existing every- 

 thing of which we are either unconscious or ignorant ? Is it 

 absurd to suppose that when one has passed the night in 

 sound slumber he has nevertheless existed ? Is it absurd for 

 the man himself to " sujyj^ose ^' even that he was not quite 

 annihilated — that he ceased not to be for some hours — and 

 was not created afresh ? We hear of cultivated minds that 

 cannot get on without something like this sort of writing. 

 Surely it must be strange " culture that makes a man 

 capable of relishing such confusion of both idea and language. 



Look a little at the fallacy of the ego considered as a state. 

 That which is a state of nothing is only nothing. It is not at 

 all unthinkable/-' it is perfectly intelligible; but only as it is^ 

 and that is as nothing. A state which is a state of something 

 is a mode of being belonging to that of which it is a state ; 

 but a state which is only a state of nothing is just nothing. 

 Ifj then^ there be not an egOj of which consciousness is a state^ 

 consciousness as positive is only an unmeaning term — that is^ 

 it means nothing. If Mr. Spencer should wish us to think of 

 a state which has no ego of which it is a state^ then let us try 

 how his idea will stand a very simple test. Here are the 

 vocables — I am conscious.^' We remove the pronoun I/^ 

 for it has no meaning — it represents nothing, and need not 

 stand there. Then we must remove the " am/' for if the I^^ 

 is not the ctm'' is false. The '^'^ conscious alone must 

 remain ; and the inevitable question arises, ^' Conscious 

 what There is no answer but conscious nothing/' which 

 is just nothing. 



