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This is very much akin to Mr. Spencer's intuition of 

 space/' What is s^pace? It is " room,^^ says one whose 



intuition '' has got at least two words by which to express 

 itself! Then, what is ^' room'' ? We are not anxious as to . 

 words, but we do desiderate that they shall mean something, 

 or at least an honest nothing.'' ^'^ Space,'' or room," in 

 which there is nothing else but " space," or room," what is 

 it ? There is a certain space, and it is at present full of some- 

 thing. Take that something away, and allow nothing else to 

 enter, the space or room remains ; but what is it ? Nothing 

 remains. But nothing is not something. The intuition " 

 of this philosopher called space " is the same as his ecfo," 

 the intuition of only nothing ! 



We cannot rationally seek the origin of the moral sense 

 here ; if anything be evident that is evident ; nor do we 

 seek it in any organization of nerve. The sense that feels an 

 idea is something never to be confounded with nerve, though, 

 like all other senses, it is associated with nerve in our present 

 state of existence. The poisonous liquid or fumes that affect 

 the nerve affect the sense, just as the harmonious wavelets of 

 sound affect the soul ; but that does not necessitate our con- 

 founding ear and soul. Water has an effect on rocks, and 

 rocks affect water, too; but we do not think it necessary to 

 confound the two : neither do we need to confound nerve 

 and mind. 



But, even if we should so far give way to his confusion, 

 a very brief appeal to the facts of the case would dissolve 

 Mr. Spencer's view of evolved intuitions. Is it true that one 

 man bequeaths to another his experiences of Utility ? Is it 

 matter of fact that a father bequeaths to his son any experi- 

 ences whatever, organized or unorganized? What are ex- 

 periences ? Are they not facts of consciousness ? If they 

 are organized, they are still facts of consciousness. Can the 

 facts of a father's personal consciousness become the facts of 

 his son's ? If Mr. Spencer means that the effects of these 

 experiences on the father's brain, or nerves, become states of 

 the brain of his son, we must still insist that the idea is not in 

 the slightest degree borne out by fact. The rule in society is, 

 that the son is found utterly unfit for the path which his father 

 has pursued with success, and fit for one altogether different. 

 And even where there is special fitness for a similar path, an 

 amount of training of no inconsiderable measure is required, 

 in order that the son may follow in his father's track. If 

 Mr. Spencer's theory were true, there would be no training 

 required to make the son follow the father. Leave him to 

 grow up as he lists, and the organized experiences " must 



