302 



wlien the occasion of the erection of a monument has been 

 forgotten, a wholly legendary one has been invented. We are 

 painfully aware that the presence of innumerable relics is no 

 necessary voucher for the truth of the stories connected with them. 



The account given by Philo and Josephus of the mode in which 

 the Septuagint version was effected is a most striking instance of 

 the imperfection of oral tradition as an accurate reporter of facts 

 after a considerable lapse of time. A period of 280 years had 

 sufficed to encrust an historical fact with such a mass of fictions, 

 that it is now impossible to disentangle the facts from the fictions. 

 One might have expected that the position of the Alexandrian 

 Jews would have been favourable to the transmission of the 

 knowledge of the precise circumstances connected with the 

 formation of this version. But the story, as handed down by 

 Philo and Josephus, not only contradicts the phenomena of the 

 version itself, but the facts of history as known from other 

 sources, and, I think, is believed by no critic at the present day. 

 What is more remarkable is, that a certain number, of huts 

 were shown at Alexandria as memorials of the fiction. 



III. I must now offer a few observations on that canon of 

 historical criticism which summarily excludes all miraculous 

 events from the region of history, and banishes them into that of 

 mythology. To what extent is it valid ? How far does the occur- 

 rence of miraculous events invalidate the whole context in which 

 they occur ? This is a question with which the historical inquirer 

 cannot help grappling. Stories of the kind are scattered over 

 the whole period from the mythic ages to the recent alleged 

 miraculous events in France. During some portions of time 

 such alleged occurrences are very rare; at others they abound. 



It will be unnecessary for me to examine the validity of the 

 principle enunciated by Hume. This has been most successfully 

 handled in a work recently published by a former member of 

 this Institute."^ I shall only offer a few observations connected 

 with the general question, which are suggested by common 

 sense. 



If all miraculous narratives are to be rejected simply on the 

 ground that no testimony can establish them, because they form 

 no portion of our previous experience, then it is evident that all 

 extraordinary events, nay, that every event which has not been 

 included in past experience, must share the same fate. It is 

 impossible to lay down a line which shall accurately discrimi- 

 nate between events which are extraordinary and those which 

 are miraculous. I am ready to admit that certain miraculous 

 events belong to an order which, with our present knowledge. 



Warington, — Can I believe a Miracle ? 



