OF BABYLONIAN CONCEPTIONS ON JEWISH THOUGHT. 327 



were effectually cured of all tendencies to idolatry. True : but what 

 follows? Assuredly this — that at such a time they could not be 

 docile learners in the school of heathen mythology, and so digest 

 such things as, at length, to give them a place in their sacred ' 

 literature — the most precious possession of the monotheistic nation. 



I am constrained to add that both Old and New Testaments make 

 it clear that the Jewish nation stands alone. The Jews are the ' 

 people of the Book ; and it is difficult to believe that they could 

 have played their divinely-ordained part if Babylonian influences / 

 had mingled with the springs of their national life. As pointing to(\ 

 Christ, the Old Testament in the providence of God has been 

 invested with a dignity suited to its high purpose and vocation ; 

 great honour has been put upon it. In such circumstances we ask, 

 " What can the mind of the flesh in Babylon yield for the service of 

 the Spirit of God 1 " Having regard to the relation of the Old 

 Testament to Christ, we answer, "It can yield nothing — nothing 

 Prophetic, nothing Priestly, nothing Messianic, as these functions 

 were consummated in Him whom we call Master and Lord." 



The Chairman then put the resolution of thanks to Archdeacon 

 Potter for his interesting paper, and it was carried unanimously. 

 The Lecturer replied and the meeting closed. 



(Archdeacon Potter has, on receipt of the following written 

 communications, kindly revised his reply so as to cover the additional 

 points raised. — Editor). 



Written Communications Received. 

 The Rev. Chancellor Lias writes : — 



The Institute is indebted to Archdeacon Potter for giving it an 

 opportunity of discussing a most interesting and important 

 question. 



After claiming the right to criticize the critics. Chancellor Lias 

 complained of their disregard of replies and proceeded : — I once 

 read a critical treatise on the Old Testament by a distinguished 

 critic, which proceeded on the following lines : This, we were told, 

 "may be," that "must be," something else was "probable" and 

 from these uncertain data a conclusion was triumphantly deduced. 

 So largely is this extraordinary mode of demonstration practised 

 that a man of scientific training once said to me that the stages of 

 critical argument appeared to him to be these : " may be, probably, 



