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REV. G. F. WHTDBORNE, M.A., F.G.S., ON 



because it seems a very frequent impression, that the need of 

 an originating cause is somehow reduced, or even done away 

 with, by evolution and its adjuncts. 



5. Tlie relationshijJ of the material and the immaterial. 



It may be as well, here, to note a point in the history of the 

 Evolutionary Theory. It was first propounded, or at least 

 prominently set fortli, as an hypothesis to account for the state 

 of physical animated nature ; but, since then, it has been 

 extended to explain both on the one side changes in non- 

 living matter, and on the other hand things that are immaterial, 

 as for instance language, morals, and even religions. Now all 

 that we have to say, at present, is that, if in regard to each of 

 these three spheres the substance of the theory is claimed to be 

 the same, its attributes must in each case also be the same. 

 If the fact, which we have just reached, that the amount of 

 cause required to produce existing effects is imaffected by 

 evolution, holds in the sphere of physical life ; then we must 

 equally conclude in the spheres of inanimate physical nature, or 

 of immaterial nature. For any other conclusion would amount to 

 an assertion that the theories w^ere not the same in the three 

 different spheres ; and evolutionists would be thereby con- 

 victed of employing the same term to express diverse ideas, and 

 in fact, w^ould be acknowledging that the very uniformity for 

 which they were arguing, was non-existent. We may therefore 

 take it as a general principle, that all the facts of nature in 

 whatever sphere predicate the same amount of originating 

 cause, by whatever mediate methods they were brought about. 



Eeturning to our storehouse, we learn another general point 

 about its data. They have to do equally with things material 

 and immaterial. In existing nature matter and non-matter is 

 inextricably mixed up ; they cannot be dissevered into 

 independent classes. Everywhere we find matter taking 

 different forms, possessing various qualities, performing diverse 

 functions ; but, along with it all, something is persistently 

 present which is not to be accounted for by it. Moreover, this 

 something is not always the same ; it is as various in detail as 

 it is consistent in its variety. To class it together as the non- 

 material, is simply to draw a line of exclusive classification 

 round matter. And yet with matter it is sometimes most 

 intimately in union. Thought and the brain, for instance, are 

 impossible to disunite, though one is material and the other is 

 not ; but, intimate as they are, they cannot owe their origin to 



