294 PROFESSOR LIONEL S. BEALE, F.R.C.P., F.R.S., ETC. 



But I see no reason why the same Almighty Power which is 

 exerted in the creation and support of living matter should not be 

 equally exerted in maintaining the laws which govern inanimate 

 matter. 



Newton in his immortal work, the Principia, closes it by an 

 argument in which he treats of the attributes of God as manifested 

 in the laws which govern the material world, concluding, " Et 

 hcec de Deo, de quo utique ex phcenominis disserere, ad philosophiam 

 nateralam pertinet" and then he adds, " hypotheses 'iion fingoT 



If I may be permitted, I will add a note on Causation which I 

 published many years ago. " A fallacy arises, I think, from 

 viewing the laws of Nature too exclusively of the material world. 

 Looking on Nature, as it is, a great and connected whole, consisting 

 of matter, force, organic life in the vegetable and animal world, 

 sentient and psychical life in man and animals, and spiritual life 

 in man — we find each lower law dominated in its turn by the 

 law of the higher existence. Thus the laws of inanimate matter 

 are dominated and interfered with by the laws of organic life in 

 plants and animals ; the laws of organic life are dominated by 

 the laws of psychical life in animals and man ; and in man the laws 

 of psychical life which he derived from Adam are dominated, when 

 he ' puts on the new man,' by the law of the ' Spirit of life,' which 

 he derives from union to Christ. The first man Adam was made 



e^'s '^VX*]^ (QCcaav ) the last Adam was made Trvevfia I^icottoiovv 



(1 Cor. XV, 45). Thus one law controls another ; the higher 

 controls the lower, interferes with its usual unimpeded operations 

 and efiect ; but is no violation of it." 



What first satisfied the mind of Socrates in inquiring into the 

 nature of Causation, was the saying of Anaxagoras, ew^ ilpx Nouf 

 eoTiv o cidKoajuwu re ical ttuvtwu airiov. " Having heard a certain 

 person reading once in a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, to the 

 efifect that it is a Mind which regulates, and is the Cause of all 

 things, I was indeed delighted with such a theory of Causation ; 

 and it appeared to me in a manner to be quite just for Mind to be 

 the Cause of everything ; and I supposed, if such were the case, 

 that the regulating Mind sets all things in order, and disposes 

 them severally in such a mode as they may best abide in." 

 {Platonis Fhcedo, Ch. xlvi.) 



