14 



of explanation are enough to make him never forget how to apply 

 to the instances in which the word is used by the Geologist. There 

 is no matter of science which might not be equally illustrated. 



If language was given to man, as the great diplomatist declared, 

 to conceal the thoughts, certainly the modern so-called scientific 

 world is very successful in the fulfilment of the end. There is an 

 older and wiser authority who tells us that it is the place of careful 

 art to conceal the show of art. It is plain that this authority is one 

 of those Classics that has not come within the " humane letters " of 

 those who use the barbarous jargon under which what ought to be 

 science is now so often hidden in impenetrable darkness. 



It will be well understood that I do not now allude to the at- 

 tempt at a universal language in Classification. That such a uni- 

 versal language should be used, if possible, for this purpose, is 

 highly important, in order to secure the identification of objects. 

 By all means let Latin be made the chosen vehicle. But it is de- 

 sirable that there should be some consistency even here. Names 

 newly given should always be descriptive — descriptive of the class, 

 and distinctive of the particular group to which the individual be- 

 longs. Instead of this, how often do we find names given — just to 

 save trouble to the slovenly namer — which are formed by an unpro- 

 nounceable compound of the name of some obscurity whom it is 

 sought to rescue, thus, from the oblivion that all such vanity deserves. 



I shall not be suspected of favouring, in these remarks, the notion 

 that any man who pretends to follow science, may make what changes 

 he likes in names and classification. There is a morality in science 

 as well as elsewhere. No one has a right to disturb or overlook the 

 arrangement given, after full investigation, to a group of objects; 

 unless he who assumes to disturb it can and does produce reasons 

 and proofs that the arrangement thus already given is founded on 

 mistake or untruth. A name once given to an object unnamed be- 

 fore, provided it be a real, that is a descriptive, name, remains the 

 name by which scientific men ought thenceforth to know it. Else, 

 there would be no end to the confusion that would arise. Examples 

 enough and too many might be given, of the confusion which has 

 arisen through the neglect of so sound a rule. This rule is, however, 

 subject to the condition that, if it is shown that the name first given 

 has been given under a wrong impression of the relations of the 



