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JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL HORTICULTURAL SOCIETY. 



slightly raised, say 5 per cent, (which Mr. Vincent Hill suggested was 

 the proper difference between them and company's risk rates, though the 

 actual difference is generally much more, and varies enormously), and if 

 all fruit, both by goods and passenger trains, were carried at company's 

 risk in future, growers would gladly pay the small extra amount, and get 

 rid of the present annoyances and loss occasioned by the non-payment of 

 claims, or the payment of them only after much correspondence and 

 delay. 



64. In the event, however, of the owner's risk rates being maintained, 

 the Committee are of opinion that the exemption of a company from 

 liability unless "wilful misconduct" is proved is too stringent a con- 

 dition ; for in hardly any case would it be possible for a consignee to 

 obtain the necessary evidence, as that would have to be derived from the 

 servants of the company itself. They consider that the term " culpable 

 negligence" should be substituted for "wilful misconduct." They are 

 glad, however, to note that, according to Mr. Hennell, the railway 

 companies seem inclined to take a more reasonable view of their liability, 

 and to admit claims in the case of total loss, and sometimes in the case of 

 damage, the assumption of this attitude being, no doubt, largely due to 

 the representations made by the Board of Agriculture to the railway 

 companies in Great Britain, the correspondence being subsequently pre- 

 sented to Parliament. [Cd. 2045.] 



65. With regard to the other evil effects said to follow from the policy 

 of combination or co-operation adopted in recent years by the railway 

 companies, it should be pointed out that working agreements may be of 

 distinct advantage to the public ; they ought to, and in some cases do, 

 ensure greater certainty of connection and punctuality of delivery than 

 used to exist in the days of keen rivalry and competition. At the same 

 time, it is clear that the companies, in consequence largely of trade 

 depression and decreasing dividends, have been induced by the advantages 

 they derive from combination to curtail facilities granted by them before, 

 much to the annoyance and loss of growers and traders generally. Some 

 of these facilities were such as growers had no right to demand, but the 

 withdrawal of such privileges, once granted, is none the less felt to be a 

 grievance. The most serious aspect of the case, however, is that by 

 means of combination the railways are rapidly becoming a powerful 

 monopoly, against which it is practically impossible for auy individual or 

 for any ordinary association to contend ; and the Committee are of 

 opinion that it will soon be necessary, if indeed the time has not already 

 arrived, for the Government to appoint an official, or a Department, to 

 watch over the companies' actions in the interest and for the information 

 of the general public, and to report to Parliament. 



GO. The Committee are disposed to think that the action of the Board 

 of Trade under the Conciliation Clause has been most advantageous to 

 traders, so far as it has been employed, and they agree with Sir Herbert 

 Jekyll in holding that the Board's powers under the clause should not 

 be made compulsory. As the late Sir Courtenay Boyle remarked, the 

 strength of the clause is in its weakness. If the official appointed to 

 conduct negotiations under the clause had power to fix a rate, the railway 

 companies would not be inclined to come before him, but would prefer to 



