CONNIVANCE OF CHIEFS, ETC. £83 



have a deep intcr-est in ita iuaititen<mce. Thh system of 

 coiiniTance, amoiintmg to partnership witTi tlie marautler, 

 seems to bave long furmshed a plausible ground for 

 treaties between the Dutch Governmont, anil t!ie various 

 Sultans and Priuces of the Arcbipelago. Signs of a selfish 

 commercial poUcy are generallj^ discenublo in tiiese 

 docuiuents : but ou this tfc need not dwell. If^ however, 

 we bear in mind the simple fact that tliese Sultans 

 and Princes are tliemaelves no bettcj* than piratesj we may 

 appreciate the advantage, or rather perceive the absolute 

 necessityj of having some one to deal with them, in the 

 furtherance of our plans for the suppressiOM of piracy, 

 who shall understand their character : indeed, the qualifi- 

 cations recpusite for iiegociating with, and acquiring an 

 iiifluenee over, treacherous chiefs and savage people are 

 neither few nor of a common kind ; and hence I think it 

 is easier to raise theoretical objections against " incom- 

 patible oiSces," " conflicting duties," &c., than to find any 

 other man half so well tpiafified as the present Com- 

 missionor to represent the interest-s of humanity with the 

 independent chiefs of Borneo. The personal qualifications 

 af^d the pecuhar position of Sir James Brooke, as Eajah of 

 Sarawak, cannot be co7nbine4 in any other person ; w^hile 

 they remarkably fit Mm for a sphere of action in whicli 

 an influence beneficial to milUons may be exercised. 



One — indeed the principal— task imposed upon the 

 person in this position, is to shut up agiunst the established 

 piratical communities of the Archipelago an iniquitous 



