125 



admitted, however, that any cession of this kind 

 m totally averse to the usual maxims of the Si- 

 amese Government- It may, however^ be ob- 

 served that if there ever wa?* such a cri^^is vvliieh 

 coidd have induced the Siamese to renounce 

 four of their ancient and native provinces incur 

 favour, it would be comparatively easy to pro- 

 cure the cesbion of Queda. 1 may even venture 

 to add lhat» in my opinion, the cession oi" all Que- 

 da would be procured with no greater difficulty 

 than the cession of Pinang" alone, and the cession 

 of" the whole Malay Peninsula than the cession 

 of Quedf*. The only difficulty in the case will 

 be to procure any species of cession which will 

 be recognised by a Government so coiisiituted as 

 the Siamese. If our negociatioas with Siam 

 were for the present confined solely to the ob- 

 ject of opening a trade with tiiat country, 1 con- 

 ceive that the very same dithculties would occur, 

 and that no trade except of the most Umited na* 

 ture» would be permitted, the obstructiuns aris- 

 ing; equally from the Chinese maxima of Govern- 

 ment, which they have adopted, the ignorance 

 of the Siamese Ministers, their short sighted ra* 

 pacity and jealousy of Europeans, which jealousy 

 will hardly fail to be increased by their* becoming 

 better acquainted with our naval and military re- 

 sources. The opinion, therefore, wliich I ven- 

 ture to express on the subject is that, though nu- 

 merous circumstances tend to render an alliance 

 with Siam desirable, nothing is to be expected 

 from any other than an armed ne^ociation. Si- 

 am, situated between two powerful nations, the 

 Burmans and Cochin- Chinese, by each of which 



* The evcnl haM fully d«aioastnt«d the ftcciiratjf uf this opinion. 



