ON MATERIALISM 



able to conduct you ; for I feel, and have felt deeply as we have proceeded, 

 that they have rather had a tendency to teach us how ignorant we are 

 than how wise ; how little is really known than how much has been actually 

 discovered. And if this be the case with respect to our course of study 

 thus far pursued, I much suspect that what is to follow has but httle chance 

 of giving a higher character to our attainments ; for the subject it proposes 

 to touch upon, the doctrine of psychology, or the nature and properties of 

 the mind, is the most abstruse and intractable of all subjects that relate to 

 human entity, or the great theatre on which human entity plays its impor- 

 tant part ; and, perhaps, so far as relates to the mere discoveries of man 

 himself, remains, excepting in a few points, much the same in the present 

 day as it did two or three thousand years ago. 



This subj.ect forms a prominent section of that extensive branch of 

 science which is generally known by the name of metaphysics, and which, 

 in modern times, has been unjustifiably separated by many philosophers 

 from the division of physics or natural philosophy ; and made a distinct 

 division in itself As a part of physics, or natural philosophy, it was uni- 

 formly arranged by the Greeks ; as such it occurs in the works of Aristotle, 

 as such it was regarded by Lord Bacon, as such we meet with it in Mr, 

 Locke's correct and comprehensive classification of science, and as such 

 it has been generally treated of by the Scottish professors of our own day. 

 And 1 may add that it is very much in consequence of so unnatural 

 a divorce, that the science of metaphysics, has too often licentiously 

 alhed itself to imagination, and brought forth a monstrous and chimerical 

 progeny. 



The term, though a Greek compound, is not to be found among the 

 Greek writers. The first traces of it occur to us in the Physics of 

 Aristotle, the last fourteen books of which are entitled in the printed edi- 

 tions, Tm fAerecTct^vTutc ; Of things relating to Physics ;" but even this 

 title is generally supposed to have been applied, not by Aristotle himself, but 

 by one of his commentators, probably Andronicus, on the transfer of the 

 manuscripts of Aristotle to Rome, upon the subjugation of Asia by Sylla, 

 in which city this invaluable treasure, as we had occasion to observe not 

 long ago, had been deposited as a part of the plunder of the library of 

 Apellicon of Teia.* 



In taking a general survey of the subject immediately before us, there 

 are three questions that have chiefly occupied the attention of the world ; 

 the essence of the mind or soul ; its durability ; and the means by which 

 it maintains a relation with the sensible or external world. Let us devote 

 the present lecture to a consideration of the first of these. 



Is the essence of the human soul material or immaterial ? The ques- 

 tion, at first sight, appears to be highly important, and to involve nothing 

 less than a belief or disbelief, not indeed in its divine origin, but in its 

 divine similitude and immortality. Yet I may venture to afllirm, that there 

 is no question which has been productive of so little satisfaction, or has 

 laid a foundation for wider and wilder errors, within the whole range of 

 metaphysics. And for this plain and obvious reason, that we have no dis- 

 tinct idea of the terms, and no settled premises to build upon.t Corrup- 

 tibility and incorruptibility, intelligent and unintelligent, organized and in- 

 organic, are terms that convey distinct meanings to the miind, and impart 



\ 



\ * Ser. I. Lect. XI. 



\ t Se« Locke oii>H«m. Unders. eh. xxiii. book ii. 



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