iNO IMMATERIALISM. 



367 



tiriginating near the mouth ; sometimes of an uniform diameter with the 

 cord itself, and sometimes rather larger ; and in infusory and zoophytic 

 worms we have no trace either of nerves or brain. 



In these last, therefore, it is possible, and indeed probable, as I have 

 already observed, that there is no sensation : the vital principle, and the 

 instinctive faculty, which is the operation of the vital principle, by the 

 exercise of certain natural powers constantly appertaining to such princi- 

 ple, alone producing all the phaenomena of life as in plants. In most 

 insects, for the same reason, it is possible, and indeed probable, that 

 though there is sensation, there is little or no intelligence : the brain, which 

 is the sole seat or organ of intelligence, being totally destitute, in most of 

 them, and of very minute compass in the rest. In fishes we have reason 

 to apprehend diflerent degrees of intelligence ; in many amphibials 

 somewhat more ; more still in birds and quadrupeds, and most of all in 

 man. 



But what is intelligence, which is a distinct principle from sensation, 

 and to which, as in the case of sensation, a distinct organ is appropriated? 

 An organ, moreover, which, like that of simple sensation, may be also 

 produced out of an insentient egg by the mere apphcation, so far as we 

 are able to trace the different substances in nature, of a certain propor- 

 tion of heat ; for the egg of the hen, unquestionably insentient when first 

 laid, becomes equally hatched and endowed with the organs and proper- 

 ties both of sensation and intelligence, by the apphcation of a certain 

 portion of warmth, whether that warmth be derived from the body of the 

 hen, of a dung-hill, an oven, or the sun. But though we know the organ^ 

 what information does this give us of the thing itself? In what respect 

 is intelhgence connected with the brain ? Does it result from its mere 

 peculiarity of structure, secreted, like the blood, but of a finer and more 

 attenuate crasis, or is it a something superadded to the organ ? Is it matter 

 in its most active, elaborate, and etherealized form, or is it something more 

 than matter of any kind ? and, if so, how has this superadded essence 

 been communicated ? 



To this point we can proceed safely, and see our way before us : but 

 shadows, clouds, and darkness rest on all beyond, while the gulf on which 

 we sail is unfathomable to the plummet of mortals. 



It is something more than matter, observes one class of philosopherSj 

 for matter itself is essentially unintelligent, and is utterly incapable of 

 thought. But this is to speak with more confidence than we are warranted | 

 and unbecomingly to limit the power of the Creator. It has already ap* 

 peared that we know nothing of the essential properties of matter. If it 

 be capable of gravitation, of elective attractions, of life, of instinct, of sen- 

 sation, there does not seem to be any absurdity in supposing it may be 

 capable of thought : and if all these powers or endowments result from 

 st>mething more than matter, then is the visible world as much an imma- 

 terial as a material system. 



On the other hand, it is as strongly contended by an opposite class of 

 philosophers, and the same train of arguments has been continued, almost 

 without variation, from the days of Epicurus, that the principle of thought 

 or the human mind must be material ; for otherwise the frame of man, we 

 are told, will be made to consist af two distinct and adverse essences, pos- 

 sessing no common property or harmony of action. But this is to speak 

 with as unbecoming confidence as in the former case. The great visible 

 frame of the world seems to point out to us in every part of it a cO-exist- 



