OF COMMON SENSE. 



4M 



. Now, what is to be collected from all thi^ pompous heraldry of high- 

 sounding names, so totally inconsistent with the precision of an exact 

 science ; and which certainly would not have been allowed had this school 

 been able to settle among themselves, or to communicate to the public, 

 a clear idea of the seat, nature, or attributes of the new, and as I trust to 

 prove, imaginary faculty it thus ventured to introduce ; and which, after 

 all, is only intended to supply the place of the innate ideas of M, Des 

 Cartes, as these innate ideas were designed to supply the place of the in- ? 

 telligible world of the Greek schools ? 



"It is hardly possible for us," says Dr. Beattie, " to explain these dic- 

 tates of our nature according to common sense and common experience, 

 in such language as shall be liable to no exception. The misfoFtune is.j 

 that many of th^ words we must use, though extremely well understood, 

 are either too simple or too complex in their meaning to admit a logical 

 definition."^ But the plain fact is, that they have not come to any defi' 

 nite meaning among themselves.! Let us then just give a glance at 

 the two leading terms, for it is hardly worth while to follow up the whole 

 of them. These are common sense and instinct : both of which seem by 

 Dr. Reid, and in various places by Dr. Beattie and Mr. Dugald Stewart, 

 to be used in their popular import. Can any man for a moment, who has 

 the slightest knowledge of physiology and philology, seriously admit that 

 common sense and instinct are the same thing ? or rather ought to be con- 

 founded under the same term ? Do these writers believe so themselves, 

 whenever they form any clear and precise idea of these faculties in their own 

 minds? " Common sense," says Mr. Dugald Stewart, is the common 

 reason of mankind :"| and every man of common sense will, I suppose, 

 accede to this definition. But comaion sense, says Dr. Reid, as though 

 in direct opposition to Mr. Stewart, is not reason : for it is that principle 

 which compels us ^' to take things for granted, withotit being able to give 

 a reason for them."§ ''Common seuse," says Dr. Beattie, ''is an in- 

 stinctive impulse. Common sense is not reason, but instinct. It is in- 

 * Ibid. Part i. ch. ii. 32. 



t The phrases KOINAI AOHAI or commnn sentiments, of Aristotle, Premieres Verifes or 

 primary truths of Buffier, or even Innate ideas of Des Cartes, whatever be the truth or fallacy 

 of the doctrines they impart, are far less exceptionable than that of Coramnn Sense, as 

 being far less capable of being misunderstood. Attempts have been made to support this 

 phrase by a reference to its employment by other writers, and evt u in tlie Latin tongue ; and 

 poets as well as metaphysicians have bes n brought forward with their sufFrajres. But all this 

 is to no purpose, unless it could be proved that such writers had used in the same meaning as 

 the chief supporters of the present hypothesis, and that this meaning was one and indivisible. 

 Mr. Stewart has felt himself particularly called upon to admit the loose and unsettled cha^ 

 racferof Dr. Beattie's language, and especially in (me of his accounts of Common Sense, 

 which he declares '*is liable to censure in almost every line." Elem. ch. i. lecf. iii. p. 83; 

 while Dr. Reid, on the very same subject, has been far more roughly handled both by the 

 English translator of Bnffitr, and by Sir James Stewart, ibid. p. 8^. 



" One unlucky consequence," observes Mr. Stewart, "has unquestionably resulted from 

 the coincidence of so many writers connected with this northern part of the island, in adopt- 

 ing, about the same perioci, the same phrase, as a sort of philosophical watch-word : — that, 

 although their views differ widely in various respects, they have in gene ral been classed to- 

 gether as partisans of a new sect, and as rjiutually responsible for the doctrines of each other. 

 It is easy to perceive the use likely to be made of this accident by an uncandid antagonist." — 

 Ibid. p. 89. 



I have endeavoured as much as possible to avoid being open to any such charge by con- 

 fining my remarks to a few alone of the pillars of the school before us ; and by selecting 

 alone those who, from personal friendship and confidential acquaintance with each other's 

 thoughts, are universally regarded as being both the most accordant and ablest defendants of 

 their hypothesis. And if, among writers so closely united, discrepancies of doctrine or 

 opinion should be frequent and flagrant, the only deduction that can be drawn from so unhappy 

 a fact is, that the hypolhesis cannot be made to hold true to itself, and is faulty in its foot 

 principles. 



1 Essay ii. p. 60, Inquiry, ch, ii. lect. vi. 



