432 



ON THE HYPOTHESIS 



stinct, and not reason ; that determines me to believe my touch ; it is ni- 

 slinct, and not reason, that determines me to beheve that visible sensations 

 when consistent with tangible, are not fallacious ; and it is either instinct 

 or reasoning founded on experience (that is, on the evidence of sense,) 

 that determines me to believe the man's stature a permanent and not a 

 changeable thing."*" 



Now, the first thing that cannot fail to strike us, on comparing these 

 passages together, is the contradictory definitions they contain ; the sin- 

 gular confusion which runs through the whole of them in respect to the 

 three ideas of reason, common sense, and instinct ; and the acknowledged 

 difficulty the writers feel of drawing a line between the first and the two 

 last of these principles, upon which, however, the whole system of the new 

 philosophy hinges. Surely " if reasoning, founded on experience," which 

 is the very language of Mr. Locke as well as of Dr. Beattie,be sufficient 

 to determine us, and is probably the principle actually appealed to in one 

 case of external sensation, it may well be sufficient, and be thought the 

 principle actually appealed to in all others. 



The next remark that must, I think, occur to every one, is the absurdity 

 of clothing instinct with moral and intellectual powers, with belief and 

 judgment : for we are, in other places, told that this instinct of common 

 sense possesses sentiment and moral sense. Now, all these import the 

 existence of a mind : they import more, for they import mental feehng. 

 And the consequence is, that we must either employ the term instinct 

 without a determinate idea, and in opposite significations at difierent times, 

 or we must allow to reptiles, and ought, to allow to plants, the possession 

 of belief, judgment, and mental feeling, as well as to mankind; for the ex- 

 istence of instinct is still clearer and more powerful in the first two than 

 in the last. I know there is no attendant upon these lectures who finds 

 any necessity for this confusion of ideas : and who does not apprehend 

 perspicuously, from the definitions I have ventured to lay down, and have 

 so frequently had occasion to repeat, the natural distinction between the 

 principles here adverted to. But let a man, if it be possible for him, be- 

 lieve that common sense and instinct are the same thing, can he still farther 

 believe that this is the faculty, call it by which of the two names you please, 

 that is to be an infaUible guide in physical and metaphysical, in sensible 

 and intellectual, in moral and theological perplexities ; where the finest 

 perception falls short, and the most penetrating mind is overwhelmed ? Is 

 it this which is to teach us the mathematical affections of matter ; and to 

 direct us in our duty towards God, our neighbours, and ourselves ? I again 

 refer to Mr. Stewart's own description of the boy, born nearly blind, and 

 wholly deaf, to which I have referred already. 



If this high and domineering power be instinct, then let us turn, vvith 

 due reverence, to those quarters where instinct exists in its fullest perfec- 

 tion ; let us pay due homage to the brutal and the vegetable tribes. Let 

 us return to the pretty prattle of the nursery, and learn industry from the 

 ant, and geometry from the bee, and constancy from the dove, and inno- 

 cence from the snow-drop, and blushing modesty from the rose. Let us 

 hail all these, not indeed as our equals, but as our superiors ; as more 

 richly endowed with that inspiration of the Almighty," which is designed 

 to correct the errors of sense and intelligence, and to soar to sublimities 

 to which these can never attain. 



* Essay on Trutb; part ii. ch. i. p. 95* 



