OF COMMON SENSE. 433 



But iet us part with the term instinct, and confine ourselves to that of 

 coJiMON SENSE. Why is this idea set up as a distinct principle from 

 reason ? as a principle often opposed to it, and always superior to it ? 

 Common sense is plain sense : the common judgment of mankind upon 

 subjects of common comprehension, sometimes given intuitively, and 

 sometimes by the exercise of reason, both of which, as 1 have already 

 shown, are alike mental processes. And Mr. Stewart has hence, as lately 

 noticed, freely denominated it in one place, though in my mind most 

 incongruously with respect to his own system, the common reason of 

 mankind." Its proper limit is the common concerns of hfe, and while it 

 confines itself to these it is nearly infallible ; for the common constitution of 

 our nature must, in most cases, lead us to mie common result. When the 

 legislature of our own country, (in which this principle exists with pecuhar 

 force,) appeals to the general voice of the people, it appeals to their com- 

 mon sense. But in doing this, does it appeal to their instinct, or to any 

 other faculty than their common reason, that discursive power, which, by 

 being better exercised here tha^i among other nations, has enriched them 

 with sounder and more general information upon the subject in question ? 



Common sense, however, must be confined to common subjects. Like 

 the ostrich, it is quick and powerful on the surface, ^ut its wings are not 

 plumed for flight, and it plays a ridiculous part whenever it attempts to 

 soar. When Copernicus, with a trembling hand, first suggested that the 

 sun stands fixed in his place, a'nd all the heavenly bodies move round him, 

 common sense, assuming the philosopher, to which character it has no 

 pretensions, opposed him, and science fell a sacrifice to its conceit. 

 With the same foolish vanity it denied, till laughed out of its folly by cir- 

 cumnavigation, the existence of antipodes ; or that the surface of the 

 earth, which appears to be a plane, could be spherical, and that men and 

 women of our own shape and make could exist on its reverse side, with 

 their feet opposed to our own. When the Dutch ambassador told the 

 king of Siam, who had never seen or heard of such a thing as frost, that 

 the water in his country would sometimes in cold weather be so hard, that 

 men might walk and bullocks be roasted upon it, his well-known answer 

 was delivered upon the principles of common sense. He spoke from what 

 he had seen, and from what every one had seen around him, and he relied 

 upon the common appearances of nature. ^' Hitherto," said he, I have 

 beheved the strange things you have told me, because I looked upon you 

 as an honest man, but now I am sure you are a liar."' Yet this is the 

 faculty held up in the system before us as a sure and infallible judge, 

 wiiose office it is to correct the errors of reason, and to prove to us that 

 every thing exists precisely as it appeaes to exist. ^ 



HoW' much clearer, and to the purpose, is the explanation of this subject 



* Dr. BeaUie has adopted this precise line of rcasoniug- under the influence of Coajinon 

 Sense principles ; and points out, by analogy, that the opinion of the Siamese monarch was 

 Ibimded upon a basis which nothing couid shake or ought to shalie ; for the only ap[)eal that 

 any opposing evidence could make to him must have been through the medium of his reason, 

 which is a less infailibie judge than common sense, and ht-nce less worthy of attention. — 

 " Corutnon sens6," says he, "tells me that liie ground on which I stand is hard, material, and 

 solid. NovF if my common sense be mistakf^n, who shall a&certtnn and correct the mistake ? 

 Our reason, it is said. Are then the inferences of reason, in this instance, clearer and more 

 decisive than the dictates of comraon'serise ? By no means. 1 still trust to my common sense 

 as before, and I feel that I must do so. But supposing the inlereuces of tbe one iaculty as 

 clear and decisive as the dictates of tiie other ; yet who shall assure ma that my reason is less 

 liable to mistake than my common sense ? — In a word, jio doctrine ought to be believed as 

 true, that exceeds belief and contradicts a first ruiNCiPbe/'— On truth, part i. 

 di, 1. 



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