ON HUMAN HAPPINESS. 



447 



of the worid are now-a-days at the trouble of debating the subject. There 

 is no controversy — the result is taken for granted. And hence wherever 

 education exists, or, in other words, wherever civilized life extends, we 

 are chiefly taught it, not as a science, but as a rule of action ; we imbibe 

 it as a habit ; and our first and finest feehngs co-operate with our best 

 reason in its favour. We form an abstract picture of it in our minds, and 

 delineate it, under the correct and pleasing image of the fair, the needful, 

 the sovereign good. We have already seen that, in proportion as society 

 is ignorant, men are wicked ; in proportion as it becomes wise, they grow 

 virtuous. They acquire clearer ideas of right and wrong, which ar^ ob- 

 viously nothing more than virtue and vice, under an additional set of 

 names, or in a state of activity. A nd were the rules and laws of right, 

 virtue, or wisdom to be constantly adhered to, or, in other words, the 

 will of the Deity to be fully complied with, there can be no question that 

 mankind, even in the present state, would enjoy all the happiness their 

 nature will allow of ; and that a kind of paradise would once more visit 

 the earth. 



And why, then, is not the will of the Deity fully complied with ? Why, 

 since the consequence is so undoubted, and so beneficial, are not the 

 rules of virtue constantly and universally adhered to ? 



This is a most important question, as well in itself as in its results. 



The will of the Deity, or the entire rules of virtue, are not always ad- 

 hered to, first, because, as collected from reason or the light of nature 

 alone, they are not, through the whole range of this complicated subject, 

 in all instances equally clear and conspicuous ; and, secondly, because in 

 a thousand instances in which there is no want of clearness or perspicuity, 

 there is a want of sanction — of a compulsory and adequate force. The 

 rules of virtue are general, and must necessarily be general ; but the 

 cases to which they apply are particular, 'I'he case is present and often 

 impulsive, but the operation of the rale is remote, and it may not operate 

 at all ; and hence the pleasure of immediate gratification is perpetually 

 unhinging this harmonious Isystem, and plunging mankind into vice with 

 their eyes open. 



But civil laws, moreover, or the authority of the social compact in 

 favour of virtue, are not only often inadequate in their force, but they 

 must necessarily, in a thousand instances, be inadequate in their extent. 

 It is impossible for man of himself to provide against every case of vice 

 or criminality that may ofl^end the public ; for the keenest casuist can 

 form no idea of many of such cases till they are before him ; and if he 

 could, the whole world would not contain the statute-books that should 

 be written upon the subject. 



There are also duties which a man owes to himself as well as to his 

 neighbour ; or, in other words, human happiness, as we have already seen , 

 depends almost a^ largely upon his exercise of private as of pubhc virtues. 

 But the eye of civil law cannot follow him into the performance of these 

 duties, for it cannot follow him into his privacy ; it cannot take cognizance 

 of his personal faults or offences, nor often apply its sanction if it could 

 do so. And hence, in most countries, this important part of morality is 

 purposely left out of the civil code, as a hopeless and intractable subject. 

 Yet even in the breach of public duties, specifically stated and provided 

 for, it cannot always follow up the offender, and apply the punishment ; 

 for he may secrete himself among his own colleagues, and elude, or he 

 may abandon his country, and defy the arm of justice. 



