iuLY i, 1896.] 
^o^ifi^st* AND strb:am„ 
11 
purpose. We observe that certain expressions and actions 
have certain meanings. But when the psychologist turns 
inwardly to the study of his own mind (introsppction) — 
for it is the only mind he can study after he has passed 
a certain stage in the phases of mind — his conclusions are 
according to his own powers of reasoning, be they good 
or bad. 
Thus, from the ancient philosophers down through the 
Scotch and English schools of metaphysicians, there were 
indeed very few who agreed one with another on anything 
pertaining to the science of mind. If the world's psycholo- 
gists could not formiilate a science of mind applicable to 
man, how can any science of mind be formulated for an 
entirely diiierent animal, whose subjectivity, or the inner 
workings of whose mind, cannot be known even by anal- 
ogy, as looking into om" own mind we do not know that 
the mind of the dog is in any way related to it. If we ask 
our fellow man if his mind works so and so, he will tell 
us that it does or that it does not, and thus we can verify 
our proposition. But we can ask no question of the dog. 
We judge his mentality by the visible phenomena (the 
emotions which he displays, and as being analogous to 
our own. 
I will review more minutely Rev. Mr, Adams's argu- 
ments, first repeating that I agree with him perfectly in 
holding that the dog has powers of cognition, but quali- 
fying it by not necessarily admitting that that term in- 
cludes the higher complex mental processes of reflection 
such as are conceded to man. So much has not yet been 
proven. To illustrate this point, let us take the simple 
matter of eating. The dog is hungry. Ha eats to satiety 
to appease his appetite, yet he does not know why he eats 
and he never seems to care why he does so. His bodily 
cravings are the impelling cause. He can cognize what 
is food and what is not, but he never reflects on why he 
eats or what are the eiSects of eating, or what are the con- 
sequences of not eating. He seems to have a limited 
knowledge that certain causes will produce limited results, 
but his reasoning is always simple and direct. It never 
takes any mediate forms. He never makes any abstract 
reasonings. A thing actually exists or it does not. If the 
dog cannot understand certain things iie drops the whole 
matter. He goes on in his own. little world of simple cog- 
nitions. He has not even an axiom to guide his intel- 
lect. And here let me say that I believe that the rules of 
logic have done more to set in the background the dog's 
just claim to possessing powers of reason than all other 
causes combined. The artificial formula of reason, the 
syllogism, that absurdity of logic, is not essential to good 
reasoning and absolutely falls short of meeting the sim- 
plest requirements of it. Yet because a dog's reasoning 
may not have been according to the rules, it does not fol- 
low that his reasoning is not good reasoning any more 
than that the reasoning of the savage is not good reason- 
ing. 
In his first letter on May 30 the Eev. Mr. Adams says: 
It has always been a mooted question in comparative psychology 
whether a lower animal hasthepjwer to parceive a portrait. Mart 
the word which I use— portrait. That a lower animal can parceive a 
reflection there is no doubt. Upon this recognized fact the advertiser 
played in the picture which, a good many years ago, appeared on the 
Dox-lid of a certain shoe-blacfeing, which picture represented an inter- 
esting terrier barking at his reflection in a highly polished, great pair 
of top. boots, which polish could not have been attained by the" most 
accomplished boots had not the blacking within been discovered and 
compounded. 
To a dog lover there is nothing much more amusing than a f rouzy 
cur's violently barking at his own reflection in a mirror. He evidently 
thinks the reflection a dog. He tries to get at it. He fails. He tries 
again with somewhat of uncertainty. A question has arisen in his 
mind. He draws back. He fears. There is something uncanny in 
the situation. What has every appearance of being a dog is not a dog. 
With his tail between his legs and maybe a yelp, he slinks away, glanc- 
ing furtively back over his shoulder. Now take the frouzy cur, wasb 
him, pet him, allow him to see his reflection time and again, and he 
will come to know it to be a reflection as well as you do. 
Concerning the closing sentence, will Rev. Mr. Adams 
kindly cite an instance as a precedent to sustain that state- 
ment. 
That a dog can perceive a reflection there is no doubt, 
but he does not recognize it as a reflection. He cognizes 
it as a reality. All his acts indicate that he considers it a 
real entity. This Mr. Adams appreciates when he says in 
the above quotation: "He evidently thinks the reflection 
a dog." 
The data do not justify the conclusion that a dog can 
recognize a portrait. Mr. Adams here arrives at a defi- 
nite conclusion by inference. It is really a verbal con- 
clusion. Tiie matter still stands as a proposition, capable 
of maintaining a dozen other inferences quite as truly as 
it does the inference given it by Mr. Adams. After a dog 
finds that his efforts are vain, no matter what he may be 
engaged in, he soon desists. In the matter of his own 
reflection, which to him appears to be a different dog, he 
finds that it is something which he cannot solve, so he 
drops the whole matter. Man will gaze with interest on 
a reflection, knowing it to be such, and admire its fidelity 
to the original. The dog refers it to nothing. To him it 
is in itself the original. The dog will refuse to gaz3 on 
his own reflection so soon as he is convinced that the re- 
flection is not a real dog. He doesn't recognize it as a re- 
flection. He doesn't understand it, so he gives up the 
matter entirely. 
The other example, that of a fox terrier, as the dog in 
Miop, jumping into a stream after the reflection of a 
bone, snows that the dog did not consider for a moment 
that the reflection was other than a genuine bone. To 
him it was a bone in reality. If he were to see another 
bone reflected he might not plunge after it, not because 
he recognized that it was the reflection of a bone, 
but because that he had been deceived and his prior at- 
tempt resulted in failure. It was not necessary for him 
to know in what way he was deceived or the manner in 
which it was done. The fact alone that he was deceived 
would be sufiBeient to impel him to desist from further 
effort. 
Picking up pieces of tin on which were the figures 1, 2, 
3, 4, etc., according to the number called out, was not 
necessarily a cognition of the figures as figures, but from 
the unlikeness of one tin from the others made distin- 
guishable by the different shapes of the figures. It was 
precisely in the same manner that the dog would recog- 
nize a shoe from a hat by the difference in shape. The 
figures as a means of notation never entered the dog's 
mind. In such cases as trick dogs pick a block out of a 
row of blocks, each bearing a certain number, to the 
observer the dog seems to pick out the block with the 
designated number by intelligent perception, whea in real- 
ity he picks out the correct block by secret signal from his 
master. I once watched a trainer in a public exhibition 
make his dog do this trick, and although I was satisfied 
that the dog was working to signal, I could not detect the 
signal. Later, from a friend who knew the owner of the 
dog, I learned that the signal was given with the trainer's 
big toe. Moving it upward raised the upper of the shoe, 
thus making a perceptible motion, and this raised at the 
right moment gave the dog the signal to take up the one 
at which his nose was nearest. But granting, in the case 
cited, that the dog did pick up the correct tin simply from 
a recognition of its difference from the others, the act re- 
quired no mediate course of reasoning, such as would be 
required in the recognition of a portrait. Such an act 
was an act of direct mental cognition, and required no 
power of mental representation. It was precisely the 
same power to recognize differences that a dog trotting 
on a level displays when he comes to a doorstep, changes 
his gait in ascending it and nimbly jumps up two or three 
steps at a time. 
Again, in recognizing colors as Mr. Adams mentions, 
the colors served to show differences plainly perceivable 
to the eye. They had no reference to anything else as 
colors. It again was a direct cognition. The dog did not 
think of green being the same color as the grass or as the 
leaves of the trees. It is doubtful that he thought of 
them as colors at all. The difference served to make an 
unlikeness only. There is nothing to show aside from 
mere verbal conclusion that he I'ecognized the different 
colors or that it was at all necessary to the successful ac- 
complishment of the feat which he performed. It was a 
matter entirely of unlikeness and not of color. It was 
the same as the dog would recognize differences of smell 
by their unlikeness, or differences of sound by their differ- 
ences impressed on the sense of hearing. Again, a dog 
might recognize an object by its color, since the color 
made an unlikeness, though as a matter of fact the dog 
trusts almost entirely to his sense of smell in determining 
what an object is. Let his own master return after a 
short or long absence and the dog rarely concedes his 
identity at once. If he does not dare to approach direct 
he will take a circle till he gets the wind, then when the 
sense of smell vouches for the person's identity he im- 
mediately abandons all suspicion and comes to his master 
with full confidence. 
A dog might be deceived by a painting of a beefsteak 
as he was by his own reflection in the glass, but in either 
instance it was to the dog a mental reality. Failing to 
find it a reality, he abandoned it entirely as something 
which he did not understand. Being absolutely without 
knowledge of such a thing as painting, or that there was 
such a thing as a likeness, he could only in his simple 
way give up the matter, as he had no knowledge of causes 
or that they even existed. 
Now, when the matter of recognizing a likeness is intro- 
duced, the instances cited as preparatory to the introduc- 
tion of the dog's recognition of a portrait have no relevancy 
to it. All that have gone before are simple cognitions. 
The dog looking at his own reflection might discern that 
it was a reflection of himself, although the proof that hu 
does so is regrettably insuflicient. If he recognize the por- 
trait of his master, it, instead of a matter of simple cog- 
nition, as in recognizing his own portrait, becomes a 
matter of complex reasoning. In other words, Mr, 
Adams cites matters of simple reasoning to prove powers 
of complex reasoning. The data advanced hardly war- 
rant his conclusion, And in this connection let us ex- 
amine his data a little more fully. 
His friend's letter, on which he bases his conclusion, 
contains the following: 
My wife does crayon work. Last week she had on her board two 
portraits, each a striking likeness of its subject— the one of myself, 
the other of a friend unknown to Tiger. When Mrs. Creveling had 
about finished her work, and after my portrait had been placed in a 
frame and stood on an easel — the other being very near it — Tiger was 
admitted to the room. (You will please remember that some precau- 
tion must be taken before admitting him to a studio, as his tail is not 
conducive to the good order of such a place.) Immediately upon see- 
ing his master in crayon he walked over to the easel and enaeavored 
to kiss the face. It was covered by glass. A second attempt was 
made to show his recognition of and love for his master. He could 
only touch the glass. This trial was enough to convince him that any 
further attempts to kiss the object of his love would be in vain; so he 
lay down In front of the easel, his eyes riveted on the covered face 
thereon, and over his face passed an expression of combined disap- 
pointment and love that was truly pathetic. He would fain have 
kissed my cheek to tell me of his love. After a few moments of men- 
tal anxiety he rose, came over to where I was sitting, got on my lap 
(he weighs lOSlbs.), kissed the living face, expressed his love, and fully 
showed his great delight that his master still existed in tangible form 
The subject of the pencil, It is quite useless to tell you, was as much 
pleased as Tiger, 
Let us now consider the actions of a man examining the 
portrait of a friend, or as the mental scientist would say, 
observe the mental phenomena which he exhibits. His 
face may take on a pensive look. He does not reach out 
to shake hands with it, or slap it on its shoulder, ortalktoit. 
He knows it is only a representation. It is only a sem- 
blance — not a reality. 
Now observe the actions of Tiger. They did not indi- 
cate that he knew the portrait was a representation of his 
master. He manifested all the emotion of gazing on a 
reality. "He walked up to the easel and attempted to 
kiss the face," says the writer of the letter. He made an- 
other attempt to kiss the face, but was again balked by 
the glass which was in front of the picture. Then "he 
lay down in front of the easel, his eyes riveted on the 
covered face thereon, and over his face passed an ex- 
pression of combined disappointment and love that was 
truly pathetic." All these signs indicated that he consid- 
ered the picture a reality. He attempted to kiss it. He 
was repulsed. He lay down before it and gazed on it as 
if it were his master really before him. He showed all 
the emotions coming from a genuine belief in the actual 
presence of his master. When he turned to his living 
master his expression of emotion was identical with that 
exhibited to the portrait. Nothing indicated that he knew 
or suspected that he was looking at a reflection — a por- 
trait. The dog's actions were real, they were such as he 
displayed to his master's person, and the valid conclusion 
is that he thought that it was really his master which he 
beheld. 
At the risk of appearing captious, I desire to say that 
the analogy between Tiger and Shakespeare seems a bit 
forced, since the Rev. Mr. Adams explains that Shake- 
speare was only more highly endowed with faculties which 
were not uncommon to his fellows. But Tiger, so far as 
the evidence goes, stood alone in his powers of intellect. 
If a man possesses powers which were never known to be 
possessed before by man, it is considered alft of the do- 
main of the genius and in that of the miraculous. Bat 
Tiger not being essentially different from other dogs, and 
the data being imperfect, and the inferences not being so 
convincing, and it not being shown that there are not; 
many opportunities for many other inferences from the 
same data, ones contradictory to his peroejition of a por- 
trait, is it not possible that all things which he can cognize 
are realities to him, and that Mr, Adams's inference is 
merely verbal? Take the similar traits exhibited by all 
dogs, note their relations to each other, and the legitimate 
conclusion is that they have no complex powers of rea- 
soning in a purely subjective manner; that is abstract rea- 
soning. 
I believe with Mr. Adams that the dog has powers of 
reason; our divergence of belief is on the degree of it; and 
while my argument has been in a positive manner against 
Mr. Adams's data, I simply have endeavored to show that 
his proposition is not proven, and not that it is impossible. 
The data up to the present time do not sustain his proposi- 
tion, nor warrant his conclusion. The matter to gain a 
belief with the world should be free from any petitio 
principii, A Posteriori. 
E. F. T. Club's Derby Entries. 
Herewith is the list of entries for the club's Derby, 49 
in all: 29 setters and 20 pointers. Last year the entries for 
Derby numbered 40. Two years ago 85. The pointer men 
are waking up. Twenty pointer entries is the largest 
entry since 1888. 
pointers, 
John S. Wise's Robin, 1. and w. dog (Strideaway— Beu- 
lah III.), March 8. 
John S. Wise's Damgn, 1. and w. dog (Strideaway — Beu- 
lah III,), March 8. 
H. S. Smith's Ripple, 1, and w. bitch (Rip Rap — Pearl's 
Dot), May 24. 
T. W. O'Byrne's Moerlin, b, and w. dog (Rip Rap— Belle 
of Oasian), March 4. 
, Furlough Lodffe Kennels' Ridgeview Tammany, I. and 
w. dog (Lad of Kent — Ridgeview Tricks), May 24. 
Furlough Lodge Kennels' Furloui<h Tricks, i. and w. 
bitch (Jarre — Furlough Cling), Jan. 25. 
Furlough Lodge Kennels' Pat, 1. and w. dog (Ightfield 
Upton— Ightfield Blythe), May 8. 
J as. S. Crane's Firefly, 1. and w. bitch (RTp Rap— Clip- 
away II,), May 5. 
Del Monte Kennels' Tick's Kid, b. and w, dog (Tick 
Boy — Lula K,), April, 
Del Monte Kennels' Toney Works, 1. and w. dog (Tick 
lioy — Lula K,), April. 
Dr. C. I. Shoop's Aloysia, I. and w. bitch (Rip Rap- 
Dolly D.), May 18. 
W. I. Love's La Dolle, 1. and w. bitch (Love's Kent — 
Fritz Fay), May 12. 
T. W. O'Byrne's Rad Skin, 1. and w. dog (Love's Kent- 
Fritz Fay), May 12. 
Claarlottesville Field Trial Kennels' Sahib, 1. and w. 
dog (Delhi— Selah), April 13. 
Charlottesville Field Trial Kennels' Rupee, L and w. 
bitch (Delhi— Selah), April 13. . 
Charlottesville Field Trial Kennels' Decoau, b., w. and 
t. dog (Rip Rap— Dolly D ), May 12. 
Hempstead Farm Kennels' Hemp.stead Druid, dog. 
W. B. Townsend's La Rosa Elgin, b., w. and t. bitch 
(Kent Elain— Julia Paine), Feb. 3, 
F. R. Hitchcock's Tory Maxim, 1. and w. dog (King of 
Kent — Queen's Grace), April. 
F. R. Hitchcock's Tory Maid, 1. and w. bitch (King of 
Kent — Queen's Grace), April. 
setters. 
Robert Dudley's Ney, b., w. and t. dog (Roi d'Or— Tory 
Lit), April 15. 
Robert Dudley's Lawnes, b., w. and t. dog (Roi d'Or— 
Tory Lit), April 15. 
H. B. Ledbetter'a Walter Gladstone, b., w. and t. dog 
(Gladstone Boy— Nat's Queen), March 6. 
P. Lorillard, Jr.'s, Merry Maiden, b., w. and t. bitch 
(Eugene T.— Maiden Mine), March 26. 
P. Lorillard, Jr.'s, Lulu L., b., w. and t. bitch (Eugene 
T.— Beryl), Feb. 30. ^ » 
P. Lorrillard, Jr.'s, Olivette, b., w. and t. bitch (Eugene 
T.— Beryl), Feb. 20, 
P. Lorillard, Jr.'s, Count Gloster, b., w. and t, dog 
(Eugene T.— Gloster's Girl), March 3, 
P. Lorillard, Jr.'s, Maid's Lad, b., w. and t. dog (Eugene 
T.— Maiden Mine), March 26, 
F. R, Hitchcock's Tory Rustic, b., w. and t. dog (Count 
Gladstone — Rhoda Rod), February. 
John White's (agt.) Alma, bitch (Roi d'Or— Tory Lit), 
April 15, 
Dr. Geo. Eubank's Rodstone, b., w. and t. dog (Cinch— 
R)d's Florence), Jan. 7, 
A. C. Peterson's Minnie P., o. and w. bitch (Antonio- 
Nellie Bly), Jan. 25. 
Avent & Thayer's Orester, b., w. and t. dog (Orlando— 
Dollie Wilson), April 29, 
Avent & Thayer's Orinda, b. , w. and t. bitch (Orlando— 
Dollie Wilsor/), April 29. 
Avent & Thayer's Paladin, b., w. and t. dog (Count 
Gladstone— Hester Peyne), April 26, 
Avent & Thayer's Peconic, b., w. and t. dog (Count 
Gladstone — Hester Peyne), April 26, 
S O. Cundy's Rod's Queen, b., w. and t. bitch (Rodfield 
—Opal), Feb. 1. • 
Geo. E. Gray's (agt ) Rod's Pell, b., w. and t. bitch (Rod- 
field— Opal), Feb. 1. 
W. R. Holliday's Billy T., b. and w. dog (Revenue- 
Daisy B.), July 20. 
H. K. Devereux's Grannon, b,, w. and t. dog (Antonio 
— Nellie Hope), June 14. 
H. K. Devereux's- May Hope, 1. and w. bitch (Anton' 
— Nellie Hope), June 14. 
Hobart Ames's Gusnn, b., w. and t. bitch (Blue Rid 
Mark — Lou R,), AprU. 
Hobart Ames's Christena, b., w. andt. bitch (Blue Ridge 
Mark— Lou R,), April. 
J. J. Odom's Count Odom, o. and w. dog (Count Glad- 
stone — Nellie Avent), January. 
S. P. Jones's Hurstbourne Zip, b. , w. and t. dog (Tony 
Boy— Dimple II,), May 20, 
Charlottesville Field Trial Kennels' Pin Money, b., w, 
and t. bitch (Count Gladstone— Daisy Croft), May 18. 
Charlottesville Field Trial Kennels' Shadow, 1. and w. 
biich (Count Gladstone— Diisy Croft), May 18. 
Ernest Johnson's Q ueen of Morocco, b,, w. and t. bitch 
(Spot B.— Miss Monk), Jan. 5, 
Furlough Lodge Kennels' Miss Busy, b. and w. bitch 
(Bold Rock— Furlough Belle), Feb. 26, 
Simon C. Bradley, Sac'y. 
