^14 
FOREST AND STREAM. 
[Sbpt. 11, 1867. 
DOGS AND THE S. F. P. C. A. 
Wb take from our esteemed contemporary Our A.nimal 
Friends, the organ of the S. F. P. C. A. id this city, the 
opinioa of the court iu a case recently decided, in which was 
involved the constitutionality of the law giving into the 
hands of the Society the licensing of dogs and the destruc- 
tion of such dogs as are not licensed. The cases before the 
court were actions brought against the Mohawk and Hud- 
son River Humane Society: 
The Cases Before the Court. 
Frederick Fox, Plaintiff, v. The Mohawk JlND HtrDSON 
River Humane Societt, Defendant. 
Melvine L. Evans, Plaintiff, v. The Mohawk and Hudson- 
RiVKR Humane Sociktt, Defendant. 
(Supreme Conn, Albany Trial Term, Jane, 189T ) 
ISIThetwo above-entitled actions were respectively brought by 
the owners of certain dogs within the corporate limits of the 
city of Albany who a=!k in their complaints that Chapter 448 
of the Laws of 189G be adjudged unconstitutional and void 
and that the defendant, its officers and agents, be restrained 
from destroying the plaintiffs' dogs. 
By Section 1 of Chapter 448 of the Laws of 1896, it was pro- 
vided that: "Every person who owns or harbors one or more 
dogs within the corporate limits of any city having a popu- 
lation of more than 20,000 and less than 800,000, where a duly 
incorporated society exists, or may hereafter exist, for the pre- 
vention of cruelty to animals, except in the city of Buffalo, 
shall procure a yearly license for each animal, paying the 
sum of il for each one." 
The act further provides that the dog so licensed shall 
have a collar about its neck with a metal tag attached there- 
to bearing the number of the license. Such tag is to be sup- 
plied to tlie owner with the certificate of license. Dogs not 
licensed pursuant to the provisions of the act shall be seized, 
and if not redeemed within forty-eight hours may be de- 
stroyed or otherwise disposed of at the discretion of the 
society empowered and authorized to carry out the provi- 
sions of the act. 
Any person claiming any dog seized under the proAision of 
the act, on proving owner.ship, shall be entitled to resume 
possession on payment of $3. 
The act further provides that the societies referred to are 
empowered and authorized to carry out the provisions of the 
act and to issue licenses and renewflls and collect fees, 
"which fees are to be used by such society toward defraying 
the cost of carrying out the provisions of this act, and main- 
taining a shelter for lost, strayed or homeless animals, and 
for Its own purposes." The act also provides that any per- 
son who shall hinder, molest or interfere with any officer or 
agent of such society while in the performance of any duty 
enjoined by the act shall be deemed guilty of a misde- 
meanor. 
The plaintiffs claim the act to be unconstitutional for the 
following reasons: 
1. It takes property without due process of law and with- 
out just compensation, in violation of Article 5, Section 1, of 
the Constitution of the United States, and Article 1, Section 
6, of the Constitution of the State of New York. 
2. It is an unauthorized exercise of the power of taxation. 
3. It permits irresponsible persons without any badge of 
authority other than that employed by the Society for the 
Prevention of Crueltv to Animals to invade the residence or 
home of a citizen, aud in case a person hinders, molests or 
interferes with anj; officer or agent of such society while in 
the performance of his duty, subjects such person to crim- 
inal liability. 
4. It is a special city law, and has not been, submitted to 
any municipal authority for approval. 
5. It is a local act within the meaning of Article 3, Section 
16, of the Constitution of the State of New York, and the 
subject is not expressed in the title as thereby required. 
Opinions of the Court. 
I.— DOGS AS PROrERTT. 
Chase, J. — Although the Constitution of the United 
States and the Constitution of the' State of New York pro- 
vide that a person shall not be deprived of his property with- 
out due process of law, and that private property shall not 
betaken for public use without just compensation, yet all 
the States of the Union recognize and exercise a certain 
power known as the police power of the State, to preserve 
and promote public safety and welfare. Police power is ex- 
ercised by the Legislatures of the several States, and the 
Legislature determines when the public safety and welfare 
requires its exercise. Unless the Legislature, under pretense 
that it is essential to the public safety and welfare, arbi- 
trarily exercises such police power the courts will not inter- 
fere with or restrain the carrying out of the provisions of 
such statutes. 
The first question for determination in this case is whether 
Chapter 448 of the Laws of 1896 is a proper exercise of the 
police power of this State. 
In this State dogs are recognized as property, and an 
action will lie for their conversion or injury, At common 
law the crime of larcenj^ could not be committed by feloni- 
ously taking and carrying away a dog. Mullaly v. People 
of the State of New York, 86 N. Y. 365. 
The United Stales Supreme Court very recently decided 
the case of Sen tell v. New Orleans & Carrollton Railroad 
Company, 17 Sup Ct. Rep., being an action to recover for 
injuries to a dog in the State of Louisiana. The opinion of 
Mr. Justice Brown in discussing the nature of dogs and the 
right of the several States to pass statutes relating to dogs 
is so complete and accords so fully with my own views on 
the subjects discussed, that I quote from the same at 
length: 
•'The very fact that they are without the protection of the 
criminal laws shows that property in dogs is of an imperfect 
or qualified nature, and that they stand, as it were, between 
animals ferce natwrm, in which, imtil killed or subdued, 
there is no property, and domestic animals, in which the 
right of property is perfect and complete. They are not con- 
sidered as being upon the same plane with hor.ses, cattle, 
sheep, and other domesticnted animals, but rather in the 
category of cats, monkeys, parrots, singing birds, and simi- 
lar animals kept for pleasure, curiosity or caprice. They 
have no intrinsic value, by which we understand a value 
common to all dogs as such, and independent of the particu- 
lar breed or individital. Unlike other domestic animals, 
they are useful neither as beasts of burden, for draft (except 
to a limited extent), nor for food. They are peculiar in the 
fact that they differ among themselves more widely than 
any other class of animals, and can hardly be said to have a 
characteristic common to the entire race. While the higher 
breeds rank among the noblest representatives of the animal 
kingdom, and are justly esteemed for their intelligence, sa- 
gacity, fidelity, watchfulness, affection, and above all, for 
their natural companionship with man, others are afflicted 
with such serious infirmities of temper as to be little better 
than a public nuisance. All are more or less subject to at- 
tacks of hydrophobic madness. 
As it is practically impossible by statute to distinguish be- 
tween the different breeds, or between the valuable and the 
worthless, such legislation as has been enacted unon the 
subject, though nominally including the whole canine race, 
is really directed against the latter class and is based upon 
the theorjr that the owner of a really valuable dog will feel 
sitfficient interest in him to comply with any reasonable reg- 
ulation designed to distinguish him from the common herd. 
Acting upon the principle that there is but a qualified pro- 
perty in them, and that, while private interests require that 
the valuable ones shall be protected, public Interests demand 
that the worthless shall be exterminated, they have, from 
time immemorial, been considered as holding their lives at 
the will of the liegislature and properly falling within the 
police powers of the several States. See cases cited in opin- 
ion. * • Even if it were assumed that dogs are property 
in the fullest sense of the word, they would still 
be subject to the police power of the State, and 
■might be destroyed or otherwise dealt with, as in 
the judgment of the Legislature is necessary for the 
protection of its citizens. That a State, in a bona fide 
exercise of its police power, may interfere with private prop- 
earty, and even order its destruction, is as well settled as 
any legislative power can be which has for its objects the 
welfare and comfort of the citizen. See cases cited in opin- 
ion. * * * Although dogs are ordinarily harmless, they 
preserve some of their hereditary wolfish instincts, which 
occasionally break forth in the destruction of sheep and 
other helpless animals. Others, too small to attack these 
animals, are simply vicious, noisy and pestilent. As their 
depredations are often committed at night, it is usually im- 
possible to identify the dog or to fix the liability upon the 
owner, who, moreover, is likely to be pecuniarily irrespon- 
sible. In short, the damages are usually such as are beyond 
the reach of judicial process, and legislation of a drastic 
nature is necessary to protect persons and property from de- 
struction and annoyance. Such legislation is clearly within 
the police power of the State. It ordinarily takes the forrn 
of a license tax, and the identification of the dog by a collar 
and tag upon which the name of the owner is sometimes re- 
quired to be engraved, but other remedies are not uncom- 
mon. * * *" 
As early as 1789 the Legislature of this State passed an 
act taxing dogs and providing that any person might kill a 
dog when found chasing sheep. From 1789 down to this 
time statutes have been passed from time to time relating 
to dogs and providing that dogs should be taxed, and also 
providing that dogs should be killed without notice to the 
owner when found chasing sheep, and at other times as pro- 
vided in different acts See Chapter 22, Laws of 1789, and 
various other laws, from time to time, including the present 
"county law." 
These statutes have been generally acquiesced in as a 
proper exercise of the police power of the State, and such 
exercise of power for more than 100 years is strong argument 
in favor of the right of the Legislature to exercise such 
power without violating the constitution. If the first con- 
tention of the plaintiffs is right, it would require the courts 
to hold that the Legislature referred to, and which has been 
acquiesced in during our entire history as a State, is uncon- 
stitutional and void. I cannot so hold. The right of the 
State in the interest of public safety and welfare to destroy 
property of trifling or little value, has been frequently 
recognized by our courts. The person whose property is de- 
stroyed is, in the theory of the law, compensated by sharing 
in the general benefits which the destruction is calculated 
to secure. Health Department v. Rectory, etc., 145 N Y. 
32; Lowton v. Steele, 119 id. 236; People V. West, 106 id. 293; 
People V. Havnor, 149 id. 195. 
II.— DOG LICENSE NOT A TAX. 
The purpose of the act is not to secttre a revenue, but to 
prevent the running at large of ownerless dogs which have 
no provision made for their support, and which may become 
dangerous to the public by reason of their not having proper 
care and attention. The evidence shows that there are a 
large number of dogs on the public streets of the cities of 
this State that are or may become dangerous to human life. 
Payment of a license fee and the purchase of a tag as pro- 
vided by the act is a condition precedent to the right to own 
or harbor a dog. In the absence of the compliance with this 
condition the dog is liable to be seized and, after a certain 
interval of time, destroyed as provided by the act. No pro- 
vision whatever is made in the act for the collection of the 
license fee. 
Where the general purpose of the act is not the raising of 
a revenue, but the regulation of a business or the restriction 
of the right to keep an animal that may become dangerous 
to the public and no provision is made for the enforcement 
of the collection of the license fee, but simply prohibiting the 
conduct of such business or the keeping of such animals un- 
less the license fee is paid, the amount so to be paid is not a 
tax and is notgovernea by the provisions of the Constitution 
of the State relating to the imposition of taxes. Trustees of 
Exempt Firemen's Fundu Roome, 93 N. Y. 313: People ex 
rel. Einsfield v, Murray, 149 id. 367; People v. Fire Associ- 
ation of Philadelphia, 92 id. 3L1. 
III.— SOCIETIES FOR THE PREVENTION OE CRTTELTT TO ANI- 
MALS AS AGEKTS OE THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE. 
Societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals or 
children are recognized in the general statutes of this State. 
They exercise certain public duties, and the service they per- 
form is in part a public service. 
The officers and agents of all duly iacorporated societies 
for the prevention of cruelty to animals or children are de- 
clared to be peace officers within the provisions of Section 
1.54 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Penal Code, Section 668. 
Any agent or officer of any such society may arrest with- 
out warrant and bring before the court or magistrate having 
jurisdiction any person offending against any of the pro- 
visions of title 16 of the Penal Code. 
Any person who shall interfere with or obstruct any such 
officer or agent in the discharge of his duties is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. Penal Code, Section 668. 
The right of the Legislature to devote license fees to the 
benefit of a society having public duties, and which can be 
properly described as a subordinate governmental agency, 
has been recently upheld by our Court of Appeals. Trustees 
of Exempt Firemen's Fund v. Roome, 93 N. Y. 313. See 
Board of Under wi-iters v. Whipple & Co., 2 App. Div. 361. 
THE ACT IS GENERAL: NOT LOCAL OR PRIVATE. 
Section 2 of Article 12 of the Constitution provides: "AH 
cities are classified according to the latest State enumera- 
tion, as from time to time made, as follows: The first class 
includes all cities having a population of 250,000 or more; the 
second clasps, all cities having a population of 50,000 and less 
than 250,000; the third class all other cities. Laws relating 
to the property, affairs of government of cities and the sev- 
eral departments thereof are divided into general and special 
city laws; general city laws are those which relate to all cities 
of one or more classes; special city laws are those which re- 
late to a single city or to less than all the cities of a class. 
Special city laws shall not be passed except in conformity 
with the provisions of this section. * * *" 
The act under consideration embraces all cities of the 
second class and part of the cities of the first and third 
classes. It does not relate to a single city or to less than all 
the cities of a class. It is neither a general or special city 
law, for the reason that it does not relate to the property, 
affairs of government of cities, or of the several departments 
thereof. People exrel. Hobach v. Sheriff, 13 Misc. Rep, 587; 
People ex rel. Einsfield v. Murray, 149 N. Y. 367; People v. 
Havnor, 149 id. 195. 
Article 3, Section 16, of the State Constitution, provides: 
"No private or local bill which may be passed by the Legis- 
lature shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall 
be expressed in the title." 
The Court of Appeals, in construing Chapter 554 of the 
Laws of 1881, relating to all incorporated cities containing 
100,000 inhaiaitants or upward, uses this language: "A law 
relating to particular persons or things as a class was said 
to be general; while one relating to particular persons or 
things of a class was deemed local and private. The act of 
1881 relates to a class, and applies to it as such, and not to 
the selected or particular elements of which it is composed. 
The class consists of every county in the State having within 
its boundaries a city of 100,000 inhabitants, and territory be- 
yond the city limits mapped into streets and avenues. How 
many such counties there are now, or may be in future, we 
do not know, and it is not material that we should. 
Whether many or few, the law operates upon them all alike 
and reaches them, not by a separate selection of one or more, 
but through the general class of which they are individual 
elements. The force of the law of 1881 is not localized in 
Kings county and confined to its territory. By its terms it 
applies equally to every other county which may prove to be 
within the constituted class." 
In the matter of Church, 92 N, Y. 1, again the Court of 
Appeals, construing Chapter 449 of the laws of 1885, relating 
to all cities containing more than 500.000 inhabitants, uses 
this language: "Neither is the act a local or private one 
within the meaning of the section referred to. Such was the 
decision of this court in the matter of the N. Y, El. R, R. 
Co., 70 N. Y. 327, and in the matter of Church, 93 id. 1. 
This act is general in its terms, applying to all cities in the 
State, of a certain class, and to every corporation carrying on 
a business requiring the use of electrical wires or conductors 
in such cities. That the number of such cities is limited or 
restricted does not make the bill a private or local one, 
within the constitutional meaning and intent of these words, 
was expressly decided in the cases referred to." People ex 
rel. N. Y. Blec. Lines Co. v. Squire, 107 N. Y. 593. 
The act under consideration is general in its nature. It 
relates to particular cities as a class. It does not relate alone 
to people residing in cities having a population of more than 
20,000 and less than 800,000, except in the city of Buffalo. It 
relates to all people generally owning or harboring dogs in 
specified cities as a class. The exception of the city of Buf- 
falo does not affect the character of the act. People v. Hav- 
nor, 149 N. Y. 195; People ex rel. Hobach v. Sheriff, 13 Misc. 
Rep. 587; People ex rel. Clauson v. Plank Road Co., 86 N. 
All the objections raised to the act by the plaintiffs have, 
in my judgment, been substantially passed upon by the 
courts in this State adversely to the claim of the i^pin- 
tiffs. The complaint of the plaintiff in each caseis dismissed, 
with costs. 
Complaint dismissed, with costs. 
Doffs of the Day.— I. 
The barking of "Chief," the pet dog of Hook and Ladder 
Company No. 14, in East 125th street, angered and aston- 
ished the sleeping fiiemen about 4 o'clock this morning 
The man on house duty tried to quiet him, but could not. 
Capt. Terpery called down the chute in pretty strong lan- 
cuage to silence the animal, but nothing could be done, 
The dog whined and barked till the man on duty went to the 
stall of Paddy, the old fire-horse of fifteen years' service, with 
whom Chief slept. Then the cause of the dog's unusual 
clamor was clear. The horse was covered with sweat and 
was trembMng. 
Dr. Myers, the superintendent of horses at the training 
stable, was summoned, and he treated Paddy for colic, while 
Chief licked the horse. Paddy was too old to recover. He 
died at 7 o'clock, and the dog howled over his body, follow- 
ing it to the street when it was removed. As the children 
came out, they gathered around, too, for they liked the old 
horse because be ate sugar out of their hands. The firemen 
let the dog howl; ihey understood. — ]!fe/)o York Evening Post. 
POINTS AND FLUSHES. 
Mr. Norvin T. Harris, of St. Mathews. Ky.,' has returned 
from his wanderings in Europe and Africa. 
The mosquitoes in parts of Manitoba have been so numer- 
ous, that they fairly swarm about men, horses and dogs, and 
probablv other animals which have blood to let. 
Mr. Frank Richards said that sometimes his dogs, when 
on point, would have a blond color from the motquitoes 
which covered their surfaces. 'They were very active even 
in the midday hours. Horses were sometimes driven to 
desperation from the torture inflicted by these hungry pests. 
I am a pretty regular reader of Fohbst and Stream, and there is no 
pager with the same "tone" in the field. May it continue to be a 
source of pleasure and guidance to sportsmen for years to come. 
J. E. AOAUS. 
heeling* 
C(m.municatioint for this (iepartmefnt are requested. Anything on 
the bicycle in its relation to the sportsman is particularly desirable 
GOOD WHEELS AND LUCKY RIDERS. 
The life of a good wheel is long or short, accordingly as 
the rider may make it; either the one or the other, by care^ 
f ul treatment or otherwise. 
Careful treatment does not necessarily imply that the rider 
is to pick out only smooth and easy routes on days of sun 
shine; it does require that he ride his wheel with watchful 
care and good judgment. Two riders with equally good 
wheels may ride together over the same routes and one will 
harm bis wheel more or less, while the other will go through 
without complaint of mishap. The one rides thoughtlessly, 
passing over stones, regardless of whether they are loose or 
jfirm, sharp or smooth, and on lumpy or seamy ground he 
goes straight ahead, regardless of the jolts and strains to 
which he subjects his wheel. He sits heavily, poimding it 
with his weight as if he were an inert mass instead of riding 
lightly and with becoming skill, and relieving the shocks 
thereby. 
Greater force is necessary to pedal in careless riding, as m 
overcoming the obstructions or going over the rougher 
ground, the effort must be much greater than in riding when 
one avoids them. Sometimes the utmost power of the rider 
is necessary to force the wheel out of places which could 
easily have been avoided. There are thus constantly recur- 
ring heavy strains, and ihe intense straining and rough usage 
are all against the long life of the wheel. From such rough 
treatment wheels will become waiped, or spokes bent or 
broken, the chain and sprocket will be worn out long before 
their time, and the repair shop will become prosperous from 
the careless rider's inefficiency. 
In heedless riding, accidents will happen which result in 
broken wheels outright when the rider uses his feet alone. 
The best rider uses both head and feet. He scans the road 
carefully ahead, picks out the smoothest going, deftly passes 
