326 APPENDICES. 
A man should be liable for injury caused by his animal, whether tame or wild^ 
if it is proved that the injury was due to the owner's negligence. 
Maung Gyi v. Po To (i) approved. 
In that vieAV it would not be necessary to draw a distinction 
between wild and domestic animals. The point for decision would 
be whether the owner was guilty of negligence or whether he used 
such care as in the circumstances of the case was reasonable and 
ordinarily sufficient. The amount of care required would vary 
according to the class of the animal and according to its own dispo- 
sition. It would not be laid down in this country that a man is 
liable for any damage done by his elephant without any proof of 
negligence or that he knew it to be of a vicious disposition. In 
view of the manner in, and extent to, which elephants are employed 
in this country, such a proposition would be manifestly unjust. 
— Filburn v. People^ s Palace Company (2) distinguished. 
In the present case it was for the plaintiff to prove that the 
damage done to his elephant was caused or rendered possible by 
the defendant's negligence. In considering the question of negli- 
gence, the defendant's knowledge or want of knowledge that her 
elephant was of a vicious disposition would be an important point. 
In a suit of this kind, where an animal like an elephant is concerned, 
the burden of proving negligence is in the first place on the plaintiff 
who avers it. It might be otherwise if the injury by a tiger or a 
bear were concerned. 
White, J. — The plaintiff-appellant sued to recover damages on 
account of the death of his elephant, " Do," which died from the 
effect of wounds inflicted by the respondent's elephant, " Kya 
Gyi." 
The issues which arise in a case of this kind have been stated 
in two cases of this Court. In Maung Gyi v. Po To (i) it was 
observed that the issue generally would no doubt be the usual issue 
as to the existence of negligence on the part of the owner of the 
animal doing the damage. In Maung Swa v. Maung Kyaw (3) 
points which arise in a case very similar to the present were indi- 
cated. There has been some argument in this Court on the applica- 
tion of the doctrine of scienter. It is said that ''any one who keeps 
a wild animal, as a tiger or bear, which escapes and does damage, is 
liable without any proof of notice of the animal's ferocity ; but 
where the damage is done by a domestic animal, the plaintiff must 
show that the defendant knew the animal was accustomed to do 
mischief (4)." Again, " a person keeping a mischievous animal with 
knowledge of its propensities is bound to keep it secure at his peril. 
