APPENDICES. 
If it escapes and does mischief, he is liable without proof of negli- 
gence, neither is proof required that he knew the animal to be 
mischievous, or if it is a notoriously fierce or mischievous species (5)." 
In Smith's leading cases, in the notes on Fletcher v. Rylands (6) it 
is said : — 
*' The law of England recognizes two distinct classes of animals: The first 
class consists of such animals as sheep, horses, oxen, and dogs, which the law 
assumes not to be of a dangerous nature, and a person who keeps an animal of this 
class is not liable for any damage it may do, when not trespassing, unless he knew 
that it was in fact dangerous. The other class consists of animals which have not 
been shown by experience to be harmless by nature; and one who keeps animals of 
this class must prevent them from doing linjury under any circumstances, unless 
the person to whom it is done brings it on himself." 
In the English case on which these remarks are based, namely, 
Filburn v. People's Palace Company (2), it was held that an elephant 
did not belong to a class which, ^xcording to the experience of 
mankind, is not dangerous to man, and therefore the owner kept such 
an animal at his own risk, and his liability for damage done by it 
was not affected by his ignorance of its dangerous character." 
I understand the remarks of my learned predecessor in Maung 
Gyi V. Po To (i) above cited to go no further than to suggest that 
a man should be liable for injury caused by his animal, whether tame 
or wild, if it is proved that the injury was due to the owner's negli- 
gence. In that view, it would not be necessary to draw a distinction 
between wild and domestic animals. The point for decision would 
be whether the owner was guilty of negligence or whether he used 
such care as in the circumstances of the case was reasonable and 
ordinarily sufficient. The amount of care required would vary 
according to the class of the animal and according to its known 
disposition. It could not, I think, be laid down in this country that 
a man is liable for any damage done by his elephant without any 
proof of negligence, or that he knew it to be of a vicious disposition. 
In view of the manner in, and extent to, which elephants are 
employed in this country, such a proposition would be manifestly 
unjust. 
In the present case, therefore, I think it was for the plaintiff 
to prove that the damage done to his elephant was caused, or 
rendered possible, by the defendant's negligence. In considering the 
question of negligence, the defendant's knowledge or want of know- 
ledge that the elephant was of a vicious disposition would be an 
important point. In a suit of this kind, where an animal like an 
elephant is concerned, I think the burden of proving negligence is 
