33(^ C O CHINCH IN A. • 
mentioned treaty, were evidentl_y directed to the building and 
equipment of a naval force that should one day overawe our 
territorial possessions in the ''East ; and it is by no means cer- 
tain that the attempt will not be renewed, and that Imperial 
France may not accomplish what Monarchical France had 
only in contemplation. Their complete exclusion from the 
coasts of Hindostan will render that of Cochinchina the more 
inviting, especially as from this station our valuable trade to 
China, as well as our possessions in India, may most ef- 
fectually be injured and annojxd. But independent of the 
mischief which the possession of this place might enable an 
active enemy to meditate against our concerns in the East, 
the advantages, on the other hand, which it holds out to our 
naval and commercial interests in this part of the world 
ought alone to entitle it to a higher degree of considera- 
tion than has jet been bestowed on it. I would not 
here be understood as speaking of this part of Cochinchina 
in a colonial or territorial point of view. We may perhaps 
already possess as many colonies as we can well maintain, 
and as much territory as is -rendered useful to the state ; but 
we never can have too many points of security for our com- 
merce, nor too many places of convenience and accommoda- 
tion for our shipping. To dwell upon the necessity of keep- 
ing up our commerce, and the policy of adding facilities to 
the distribution of the fruits of our productiv^e industry, 
would be wholly superfluous. The loss of commerce must 
inevitably be followed by the loss of that rank which England 
at present holds in the scale of nations. France, having a 
larger territory in proportion to its population, perhaps gene- 
rally speaking, a more favourable climate, a more fertile soil. 
